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ABSTRACT
PREFACE
In 1948 A.D., just over 2,000 years after the
Diaspora* of 6 8 B.C., a Jewish state came into existence
in Palestine. This was of considerable significance to the
United States. Not only was it an additional consideration
in the formulation of foreign policy towards the Middle
East, but America had played a major part in the establish-
ment of the state of Israel. President Truman has been
subjected to considerable attack as a result of this, by
critics who interpret his actions as being motivated by an
ethnic pressure group and domestic politics rather than by
the national interest.
This study analyzes the factors leading up to the
decision by President Truman to recognize Israel. Such an
analysis reveals that although tremendous pressure was
exerted by Zionist organizations. Congressmen, the press
and the Democratic National Committee, on Truman to support
the foundation of a Jewish state in Palestine, he was reluc-
tant to do so. Nor was it domestic politics that led him
finally to act. Recognition in May 19 4 8; with its implica-
tions of winning the Jewish vote in the elections of that
year; was not the crucial decision for the future of Israel.
. *Diaspora — the dispersion of the Jews
lii
It was, rather, the decision to support the United Nations
proposal for partition in Fall 1947. This enabled the
Yishuv to make the Jewish state a reality. In making this
decision, and in extending de-facto recognition six months
later, Truman pursued a policy balanced between the opposing
forces of Zionism on the one hand, and the State Department
on the other. His policy rested upon the realities of the
situation in Palestine, his belief in the justness of the
Jewish cause and the hope that peace in the Middle East
would be the outcome.
The investigation is directed primarily towards
President Truman himself in his role as Chief Executive and
foreign policy maker. It is based largely on the hitherto
unused sources of the Truman Library, and tries to assess
and analyze, insofar as this is possible, Truman's reac-
tions to the pressures around him, and the situation as he
saw it. As a result, the conclusions arrived at differ
considerably from those of previous studies.
I am much indebted to the History faculty of Kan-
sas State University for their kindness and understanding.
To Dr. A. Bower Sageser, I owe a special debt of gratitude
for his generosity and assistance in formulating and guid-
ing this study.
I acknowledge, also with thanks, the assistance of
Dr. Philip C. Brooks and the staff of the Harry S. Truman
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Library, who made my task of research much easier by their
expert attention. I should like to record, too, my appre-
ciation to the Harry S. Truman Library Institute for
awarding me a grant-in-aid to carry out this project.
CHAPTER I
THE UNITED STATES AND PALESTINE: THE QUESTIONS
Palestine, its future, and the role of the United
States in shaping that future was one of the many unanswered
questions that the Presidency brought to Harry S. Truman.
It was not however, the most important or pressing problem
that he inherited. His energies, in the hectic early days
of office, were directed mainly towards hastening the end of
the War in Europe in preparation for the final assault on
Japan. The immediate and urgent tasks of arriving at a
satisfactory peace settlement, and ensuring peaceful and
rapid reconstruction on the Continent were made more
difficult for Truman since in the three months of his Vice-
Presidency, he had been largely ignored by Roosevelt, who
acted virtually as his own Secretary of State,/
At that time the mandated territory of Great Britain,
Palestine, was of only minor significance in relation to the
many problems facing the Democracies following the defeat of
Germany. Thus, when questioned at a press conference shortly
after Potsdam on the matter of Jewish immigration into Pales-
tine, Truman did little more than reiterate in general terms
the policy of his predecessor: "The American view of Pales-
tine is," he said, "We want to let as many of the Jews into
2Palestine as it is possible to let into that country. Then
the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically with
the British and the Arabs, so that if a state can be set up
there they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis."
Although regarded as a denunciation of British policy, the
statement reveals Truman's hopes at this early stage, for a
negotiated settlement. He flatly stated that he was not
prepared to send 500,000 American troops to Palestine. Nor,
it should be added, did he expect he would have to make this
kind of decision.
When viewed against the background of previous Uni-
ted States relations with the Middle East, this lack of
immediate action is not surprising. No definite or compre-
hensive American policy had been formulated towards Pales-
tine; before 19 39 the area had been little known and of con-
cern to very few. The British and French had established
spheres of influence in the region at a time when Americans
were absorbed with the Civil War and taming the frontier.
The activities of Great Britain in the Arab world following
the First World War are too well known to be recorded here.
Briefly stated the essence of the relationship
between Britain towards the Middle East was that she sought
to promote her strategic, economic and cultural interests
by means less than full colonialism but consistently short
'-Public papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Harry S. Truman, 1945. (United States Government Printing
Office, 1961), Press conference, August 16, 1945, p. 228.
3of cooperation with respected, freely self-determining indi-
genous governments . In this framework the Mandate over
Palestine approved by the League of Nations in 1923, was
the Instrument through which strategic facilities would be
sought in return for ending the Mandate and recognition of
full sovereignty.
Execution of the Mandate was complicated, however,
by the incorporation into the Mandatory Instrument of the
British Palestine Policy Statement made in 1917 known as the
Balfour Declaration. 2 This declaration was contained in a
letter of Lord Arthur J. Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, to
the prominent Zionist leader Lord Rothschild, in which the
British .Government stated in intentionally broad and uncer-
tain terms its support of a Jewish National Home in Pales-
tine.
The declaration was of considerable significance,
not only because it laid the foundation upon which the Jew-
ish community of Palestine was able to build its nation,
but because the motivation which prompted the British
Government's action foreshadowed the dilemma which it and
the United States faced in the years preceding 1948. "It is
The declaration read: "His Majesty's Government
view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeav-
ors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and politi-
cal status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
4a delusion," said Winston Churchill speaking in the House
of Commons in July 1937, "to suppose this was a mere act of
crusading enthusiasm or quixotic philanthropy. On the con-
trary, it was a measure taken... in due need of the war with
the object of promoting the general victory of the Allies,
for which we expected and received valuable and important
assistance. "3 it was, then, a compromise characteristic of
the British policy in this area. It was not all that the
Zionists had hoped for, but it committed the British to a
recognition of the historical connection of the Jewish peo-
ple with Palestine.^ In a recent study of the question
Nadrav Safran concludes that the Declaration "was issued out
of broad humanitarian considerations, for immediate tacti-
cal political advantages, and for long range strategic
interests an irresistible combination to any imaginative
Anglo-Saxon statesman."^
Between 1918 and 1948, British statesmen, adminis-
trators and soldiers tried to carry out two hopelessly
explosively irreconcilable policies. While supposedly man-
dated to prepare Palestinian Arabs for self-determination—
a
3Quoted by Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel
(Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953), p. 22.
^The draft of the declaration as originally submit-
ted by Chaim Weizmann called for recognition of the re-
establishment of the country as the national home of the
Jews. Weizmann recognized this "painful recession." A.
Lilienthal, p. 22-23. - ^'
'
%adav Safran, The United States and Israel (Harvard
University Press, 1963), p. 26.
5promise made during World War I, and which the Mandate it-
self denied—Britain was, at the same time, committed to
opening Palestine to mass colonization by Jews who openly
avowed a Zionist program of Jewish Statehood. It proved
impossible to harmonize these contradictory promises.
^
American contact, prior to 19 39, had been largely
concerned with missionaries and philanthropic work, in which
the Goverment's interests had been unpolitical or directed
towards assisting Arabs and Jews alike. For a brief period
following the First War some activity and interest had been
aroused because of the Peace Settlement, in which President
Woodrow Wilson on the insistence of Justice Louis D. Bran-
deis, had supported in a somewhat general and offhand way
the principles of the Balfour Declaration. Safran sees in
Wilson's casual involvement with Palestine and the Middle
East, and the opposing pressures acting on him; the State
Department and oil interests, on the one hand, and Brandeis
and his Zionist associates on the other, "a remarkable pre-
view of what was to happen on a grand scale with President
7
Truman thirty years later."
It is important to note, when considering the later
emphasis and the value the Zionists placed on Wilson's stand
Sprime Minister Attlee, under whose Government Bri-
tain abandoned the mandate has admitted frankly that the
British gave "incompatible assurances".
7n. Safran, p. 37. '
6at the peace conference, that in a letter to Secretary of
State Lansing on April 16, of 1919, Wilson described his
position in these words; "All that I meant was to corrobo-
rate our expressed acquiescence in the position of the Bri-
tish Government with regard to the future of Palestine. "^
Furthermore in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points Wilson
indirectly expresses his support and approval of the Arab
nationalist movements of the Middle East. Rather than
taking a definitive stand on the issue as Zionists later
successfully tried to convey, Wilson left himself and United
States policy in much the same quandary that the British
placed themselves.
During the twenties and thirties, despite the fail-
ure of Wilson's internationalism and the return to isola-
tionism, the United States tried to maintain its influence
and protect its interests in the Middle East through an
Open-Door policy. American interest soon included a 23.75
per cent share in the Iraq Petroleiim Company, and, in 1933,
g
extensive oil concessions in Saudi Arabia. It was hoped
that the Anglo-American treaty signed in 1924 would protect
these investments. The treaty which included in its pream-
ble the Balfour Declaration, on British insistence, suited
British aims also. It was the first of several attempts to
obtain United States assistance. It secured American com-
8a. Lilienthal, p. 90.
^N. Safran, p. 37.
7mitment which, it was hoped, would support Britain's posi-
tion in relation to the Jewish national home. ^ By the time
of the Truman administration, the Arabian-American Oil Com-
pany was one of the largest private American investors
overseas, and joint British-American investment controlled
the fields of Kuwait. '-
Out of these contacts and the impressions of numer-
ous travellers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, there developed in the mind of the American pub-
lic a romantic shroud of mystery; a strange combination of
attraction and repulsion concerning the Middle East. Mark
Twain was one such traveller, and he reveals in his Inno-
cents Abroad , which appeared in 1869, much of the image of
the Arab which remained active in America. He was in turn
fascinated by relics of the Crusades, contemptuous of the
infidel Turk, and repulsed by the oppression and poverty he
saw. Yet through it all the image of the wandering Arab of
the desert remained foremost. ^^
•''^Especially since this had been an even more vague
interpretation, by the Churchill White Paper of 1922, which
spoke of Palestine as a "Jewish cultural centre".
-•-^Robert H. Ferrell, U. S. Policy in Middle East,
American Diplomacy In A New Era , Stephen D. Kestesz, ed.
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1961)
, p. 275.
•'^Twain wrote "If ever an oppressed race existed it
is this one we see fettered around us under the inhuman
tyranny of the Ottoman Empire." In another chapter: "In
boyhood I longed to be an Arab of the desert and have a
beautiful more..." Innocents Abroad (London; Chatto, and
Windus, 1881) quoted in Erskine B. Childers, The Road to
Suez (London: Macgibbon, 1962), p. 43-45.
•"
-:. :..•::: 8
Lowell Thomas, Sr. contributed a good deal to keep
this image alive by his lecture-films on Lawrence of Arabia,
Thomas, a Princeton University lecturer, officially sent to
Europe to cover the War in 1917, accidentally met Lawrence
and realized that he had one of the stories of the century.
On his return to America his showings of his film, With
Lawrence of Arabia , as an immediate success, and gave the
Middle East tremendous publicity. ^^ Hollywood and Rudolph
Valentino immortalized the image of the 'Sheik of Araby' in
the public mind. This image, and the exploitation of it,
played a contributing role in turning public opinion against
the Arab case and winning support for the Jews in the heated
controversy which erupted between 1945 and 1949.
The Second World War brought the United States out
of its hemispheric isolation and served as a catalyst in the
Middle East. Out of the war came the situation that Truman
faced. Large reserves of oil went into production and al-
though President Roosevelt continued to indicate that Pales-
tine and the surrounding areas were primarily a British
responsibility, he became increasingly concerned that the
Axis powers might over run all of the Middle East.
Roosevelt, during his first three terms regarded
Palestine as strictly a British affair; he maintained that
the Jewish national home was not an American interest. Zion-
13lbid. Childers discusses the Western image of the
Arab at some length in Chapter II.
9ists felt he had "little time and less thought" ^"^ for their
aspirations, showing a deep skepticism and cool indifference
about a Jewish Palestine. Chaim Weizmann, world Zionist
leader, visiting him in 1940 remarked that while the
President had been friendly, the visit "was not a satisfac-
tory one". 15 By early 1942 it had become essential that -
the Arabs remain pacified if the Allies were to keep the
area from the German advance across North Africa. The
strategic importance of the area thus enabled Roosevelt to
avoid taking a stand on Palestine in terms of the ultimate
question.
He did not approve, however, of the British White
Paper of 1939 limiting Jewish immigration to 75,000 over
the next five years, and as the Jewish refugee problem be-
came more acute towards the end of the war he made some
personal effort to find a solution. Also, cognizant of
increasing Zionist activitiy within the United States, and
its influence on Congress, Roosevelt was not adverse to the
Palestine plank in the 1944 Democratic platform. His message
to the October Convention of the American Zionists in Octo-
ber 1944, similarly was meant to reassure American Jews of
'-^Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and U. S.
Foreign Policy, 1942-47 (New York: Pageant, 1962), p. 93.
Stevens points out that the Zionists could not afford to
antagonize Roosevelt, however, as he was the only protector
to whom they could turn. •
'^Ibid.
, p. 66. ' ., ..^. --.
":
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his interest. -^^ Roosevelt was confident, however, that he
could maintain an independent policy and handle the problem
personally, as he had handled America's entry into the war.
He hoped in this way by talking to Ibn Saud to ease the
conflict between the Arabs and Jews. -/"
Accounts as to the success of this meeting which
took place on the President's cruiser in the Mediterranean
shortly after Yalta, vary considerably. James A. Byrnes
relating the conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill
in which the President spoke of his intention to interview
the Arab leader states simply, "Churchill wished him good
luck but didn't seem very hopeful that the President would
meet with success. He didn't. "^^ However, Colonel William
Eddy, the official interpreter at the meeting, observed that
Roosevelt gave a pledge to Ibn Saud that he would not support
any move to hand Palestine over to the Jews, and added; "To
18
the King these oral assurances were equal to an alliance." °
Eddy also claims that he received a letter from the President
^^The message read: "I know how long and ardently
the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establish-
ment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish common-
wealth. I am convinced that the American people give their
support to this aim and if re-elected I shall help to bring
about its realization." Quoted by Frank E. Manuel, The
Realities of American-Palestine Relations (Washington:
Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 312.
1'^James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York:
Harper, 1947)
, p. 22.
l^William A. Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud (New York:
American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1954), p. 35.
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dated February 16, 1945, describing the meeting as "so out-
standing a success. "'^ Roosevelt later apparently confided
to Byrnes on the other hand: "I had an exceedingly pleasant
meeting with Ibn Saud and we agreed about everything until I
mentioned Palestine. That was the end of the pleasant con-
versation."^"
Nevertheless, this did not prevent Roosevelt from
repeating to Ibn Saud his promise of May 1943, that "no
decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in
that country without full consultation with both Arabs and
Jews." Zionists were shocked by the President's remark to
Congress on March 1st that he had learned more about the
Palestine question by talking to Ibn Saud for five minutes,
than he could have accomplished through dozens of letters.''-^
His soothing words, later that month, ^^ that he still upheld
his October position did little to lessen Zionist doxibts.
Zionist doubts seem justified. Roosevelt wrote to
Ibn Saud in April 5, 1945 solemnly assuring him that he
would "take no action, in ray capacity as Chief of the Execu-
tive Branch of this Government which might prove hostile to
the Arab people. .. .The policy of this government is un-
l^Ibid.
, p. 35. , •
^Ofiyrnes, All In One Lifetime (New York: Harper,
1958) , p. 242.
^^New York Times , March 2, 1945.
22New York Times, March 17, 1945.
:-•
'
~
-
.
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,
changed. "^^
President Truman, then, was confronted by a complex
and confused Palestine situation in early 19 45. The Middle
East changed drastically within the next three years. Bri-
tish territory and influence declined rapidly under the
assault of Arab nationalism and the area shortly became
entangled in Cold-War politics and diplomacy. America's
commitment to the support of Greece, Turkey and Iran, linked
with Europe's dependence upon its oil reserves, resulted in
the Middle East becoming a vital strategic concern to the
United States. And Roosevelt, by his pledge to Ibn Saud
that both Arabs and Jews would be consulted, had involved
America in reaching a settlement regarding the future of
Palestine.
Perhaps the single event most disruptive to the
precarious political and social balance of the Middle East
was the establishment of the State of Israel. In the broad-
est sense Israel was the creation and triumph of Zionism.
Zionism combined the traditional deeply spiritual yearning
for return with the practical and political needs of national-
ism and directed it toward Palestine. This was the one
country they could enter "by right, not on sufferance."
The success of Zionism was the combining of the
almost universal concern for providing a refuge for the sur-
vivors of the massacre of European Jewry with the issue of
23Roosevelt to Ibn Saud, April 5, 1945. 0. F.
204. Truman Library.
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ultimate Jewish sovereignty in Palestine. It is obvious,
however, that the movement could not have succeeded without
the assistance of Britain and the United States.
There can be little question that few post-war acts
of the American Government have proved more far reaching in
importance for the area for which they were made. Yet the
actions and motivation of the Truman administration which
played a major part in the establishment and recognition of
Israel have remained a controversial issue. Few comments on
United States policy have been favorable. Repviblicans, in
194 8, attacked the Truman administration for the weak and
vacillating stands it had taken towards Palestine. They
claimed that the prestige of the United States and the United
Nations had suffered as a result. The press, following a
strong Zionist line, was highly critical of Truman's handling
of the affair, and accused him of "playing politics" with the
lives of millions of Jews. Although approving his final
decision, the press condemned the President's acts as hasty,
impetuous and undignified. As a result, it was argued, the
integrity of America had been brought under suspicion.
William Phillips, one of the members of the Anglo-American
Committee of Inquiry of 1946, wrote of American policy: "I
am not proud of the way in which our Government handled its
responsibility, nor do I like to dwell on the shameful manner
in which Washington attempted to secure the Jewish vote in
'.\i
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the approaching National elections. "2'*
Interested ethnic and diplomatic historians have
also interpreted Trximan's actions in terms of domestic poli-
tics and the Jewish vote. H. Bradford Westerfield has de-
scribed America's policy towards Palestine as, "The classic
case in recent years of the determination of American foreign
policy by domestic political considerations. "25 The Zionists,
he argues had determination, wealth, and the advantage that
the Jewish population for which they claimed to speak was
concentrated in the big industrial states of New York,
Pennsylvania and California. The fact that they were virtu-.;,
ally unopposed by any other pressure group was an additional,
highly important, factor ensuring Zionist success in direct-
ing White House policy. Frank E. Manuel in his authorita-
tive work The Realities of American-Palestine Relations ,
concludes that the requirements of biennial election cam-
paigns and the international crisis both exerted an influ-
ence in producing a "display of kaleidoscopically changing
policy which was not edifying. "^6 in tracing the events
from 1946-49, Manuel sees the final outcome of recognition
and support of Israel only as the result of two reversals by
24w. Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston: Bea-
con, 1952)
, p. 455.
2^H. B. Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Poli-
tics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 227ff.
See especially Chapter II.
2^F. Manuel, p. 5. See especially Chapter VIII.
-
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Truman. The first was the March 1948 reversal of support
for the United Nation partition resolution, the second being
recognition itself.
Louis H. Gerson, in his The Hypenate in Recent Ameri-
can Politics and Diplomacy , sees the episode as another
example of ethnic group pressure altering the direction of
American foreign policy. ^^ He relies heavily on the evi-
dences of John M. (Jack) Redding, director of Public Rela-
tions of the Democratic National Committee for the 1948
elections. Redding reveals in his book, Inside the Democra-
tic Party , that Palestine was a sensitive issue in the cam-
paign, and despite the President's insistence that, "The
Palestine issue will be handled here, and there will be no
politics involved," he could not overcome partisan pressure
from the party and the National Committee to bring it into
the campaign. "^^
Redding feels that Truman's victory was due largely
to the success of the Nationalities Division of the National
Committee in identifying the Democratic Party with the cause
of Zionism. He describes this success as, "a classic example
of great political returns rewarding competent leadership and
27Louis L. Gerson, The Hypenate in Recent American
Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence: University of Kansas
Press, 1964), see especially Chapter IX.
28john M. Redding, Inside the Democratic Party (New
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 149. Also see pp. 104-5,
120, 127, 137, 146-7, 166, 205.
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Strenuous effort, all at small financial success."
Zionist historian, Richard P. Stevens, regards
recognition as a victory for American Zionism in accomplish-
ing the Biltmore program which spelled out Zionist political
aims in America. ^'^ Truman gave added credence to this
opinion by his bluntness on occasions. "I'm sorry gentle-
men," he told a delegation of American Middle Eastern diplo-
mats, "but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are
anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds
of thousands of Arabs among my constituents. "-^^
The apparent lack of any firm Presidential policy
further supports the case of political advantage as a major
motivating factor. N. Safran remarks that all the seesaw-
ing and confusion, besides damaging the prestige of the
United States, 'has left as residue the notion that the
United States' support of Israel and the partition plan had
been forced upon a well-meaning but weak President by sinis-
ter pressure groups regardless of the damaging effect on
2 9 Ibid.
,
p. 262.
30stevens, American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy,
1942-47 . The Biltmore program, formulated at a conference
called by the Emergency Council of the Zionist Organization
of America and held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in
May 1942, called for the fulfillment of the Balfour Delara-
tion and the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Common-
wealth. See pp. 3-5.
31w. Eddy, p. 37.
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American interests. "^^ Robert H. Ferrell in his forthcom-
ing study of Secretary of State Marshall concludes , "cir-
cumstances point to a political decision. "•^' That recogni-
tion was extended during a close election year only adds
further support to such conclusions.
These explanations, however, overlook certain as-
pects of the events leading to the establishment and recog-
nition of Israel. There can be no doubt that Truman was sub-
jected to tremendous pressure; "I do not think I ever had as
much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I
had in this instance/' he later recorded in his memoirs. ^4
The dramatic British action in preventing ships from bring-
ing refugees into Palestine, the fierce fighting and inci-
dents of terrorism that took place between '45 and '48
enabled the press and Zionist organizations throughout the
country to create tremendous public interest, and the White
House received thousands of unsolicited letters and telegrams
on the subject. ^^
• On the other hand, the State and Defense Departments
especially Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, conducted
an active campaign aimed at both parties to keep the Palestine
32n. Safran, p. 43.
^
-^Robert H. Ferrell, Manuscript of text in author's
possession.
34Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II / Years of Trial and
Hope (New York: Signet, 19bb) , p. 186.
35see Appendix A, for analysis of the density, region-
al distribution and subject of this mail.
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question out of politics. -^^ The focal area of American
foreign relations in the years following the war, was of
course in Europe. Here the outstanding constructive develop-
ments were the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March,
1947, the establishment of the European Recovery Program,
the policy of containment of Russia and the bipartisan Van-
denburg Resolution. The passage of this resolution on
June 11, 1948, reflected the increasing cooperation and
collaboration of the two parties on foreign policy that had
taken place since the war. These developments indicated
Truman's growing confidence and leadership in foreign
affairs. Everyone agreed by Spring 1947, "Harry Truman is
becoming President of the United States."^'
There were other signs also that the lines of
authority were growing tighter. Shortly after his appoint-
ment as Secretary of State, George C. Marshall ordered the
establishment of a State Department "Policy Planning Staff"
early in 1947. Truman was to look more and more to this
board of experts, under the leadership of George Kennan, for
information and advice in planning his foreign policy.
The sheer force of events in Europe forced Truman
into taking a firmer lead in making policy decisions, and
36walter Millis, ed.. The Forrestal Diaries (New
York: Viking, 1951), see pp. 309-10, 344-48, 357, 359-363.
3'^New York Herald Tribune , Spring 1947. Quoted by
Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After, America,
1945-1960 (New York! Vintage, 1960) , p. 62.
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gave him new powers. The President added another new policy
making machine which extended his power in the planning and
conduct of foreign policy. The National Security Council,
founded by the National Security Act added a new dimension
to his power, and gave Truman greater freedom from congres-
sional and popular pressures and influences. Truman's
leadership at a time of uncertainty and flux in world affairs
was decisive in his winning and maintaining control of Ameri-
can foreign policy. He was able to act with an independence
seldom enjoyed by previous presidents.
Furthermore, if the decisions were made to align New
York State's Jewish vote behind Truman, they were very
ineptly handled. Truman's pro-Israel policy fell far short
of Zionist hopes. They were quick to charge him with betray-
ing his own, and the Democratic Party's pledges. The Presi-
dent had every opportunity, between May and December 1948, to
extend de-jure recognition, hasten the promised $100 million
loan, lift the arms embargo and support Israeli membership to
the U. N., all clamored for by Zionists, Congressmen, and the
press, had political considerations been paramount. As it
was, he did little more than give public assurances (as he
had in 1946) that he would continue his Israel policy.
The vital United States decision in fact was not
recognition, but support of the United Nations partition pro-
posal in November 1947. Recognition, it is true, secured
the future of the new state, and brought with it considerable
20
American aid. But it was the United Nations adoption of the
partition resolution that was crucial to Palestine and the
Yishuv — the Jewish community in Palestine. It liquidated
the mandate and set a date for British departure. It de-
fined a legal framework in which the Yishuv could, and did,
act to establish boundaries and an authorized government.
And finally, it made it possible to get material and diplo-
matic help from abroad, especially through the United
Nations at a vital time during the fighting in Palestine, .
and it enabled them to label the Arabs aggressors and so
gain the support of world opinion. From December 1947 to
May 1948, the Yishuv worked desperately to establish and
maintain control over the partition area, so that they could
present the world with a fait-accomplis .
Thus faced with the alternative of recognizing the
provisional government, or calling upon the United Nations
to take further action he knew it could not enforce, Truman
did the only thing open to him and extended de-facto recog-
nition. In so doing he was consistent with his stated policy
of pursuing peace in Palestine and following the broad frame-
work of containing Communism by establishing a bulwark
against Russian influence. Throughout the period from the
defeat of Japan until final de-jure recognition of Israel in
January 1949, Truman tried to reconcile the pressures upon
him in these terms.
It is the purpose of this thesis to trace the events
leading to the recognition of Israel in some detail, and to
21
examine the role and motivations of the Truman administra-
tion. The focus of attention will be on President Truman
himself, based largely on the materials of the Truman Li-
brary. Little use has been made of these sources in the
studies mentioned above. The conclusions of this investi-
gation, as a result, are not always in agreement with pre-
vious opinions.
CHAPTER II
PRESIDENT TRUMAN FACES THE PROBLEM
Triiman, in April 1945, was only too conscious of his
lack of preparation to direct the nation's foreign relations,
and he willingly looked for advice. It was not long in com-
ing on the question of admitting Jewish refugees to Palestine.
Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, aware of the tense-
ness of the Middle Eastern situation and anticipating Zionist
pressure on the new President warned Truman against endanger-
ing the peace by any hasty action.! The pressure Stettinius
feared came within a few weeks through Senator Robert F.
Wagner of New York. Wagner, playing upon Truman's loyalty
to Roosevelt and his policies, pointed out in a letter of
April 18 that F.D.R. had on several occasions supported the
Jewish immigration into Palestine, and the founding there of
a Jewish commonwealth. ^ He pointed out that as late as
March 16, the late President had, on his return from Yalta,
publicly re-affirmed his position through Zionist leader Dr.
Stephen Wise, and he urged Truman to follow this policy.
library.
•^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II, p. 158,
^Wagner to Truman, April 18, 1945, O.F. 204, Tr\man
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An unanswered letter of King Abdullah of Trans Jordan
gave acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew the Oppor-
tunity to suggest the opposite course of action based on the
same grounds; that of following Roosevelt's policy. Grew
reminded Truman that several letters had been received from
Arab leaders and Roosevelt had promised them he would not
act without "prior consultation with Arabs and Jews."^ It
had become a matter of course, and Grew added, "We believe
it would be appropriate for you to acknowledge this letter
and renew these assurances." The President could do little
more than approve the drafted letter attached, dated May 17.
The approaching Potsdam Conference was the occasion
of a further letter from Wagner. With it was enclosed a
statement signed by 54 Senators and 250 House of Representa-
tive members which read:
We earnestly request you to use your influence with
the government of Great Britain, the Mandate for
Palestine, to open forth with the doors of Palestine
to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization;
and we hope that you will urge all interested govern-
ments to join with the United States towards the end
of establishing Palestine as a free and democratic
Jewish commonwealth at the earliest possible time.^
The President's comments on his return to America indicate
that he had both aspects of the problem in mind, but he
^Memorandum of Grew to Truman, May 14, 1945, O.F.
204, Truman Library.
^Ibid. Similar letters had been received from Jor-
dan, Syria, and Iraq from time to time.
^Wagner to Truman, July 3, 1945, O.F. 204, Truman
Library.
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refused to associate the refugee question with that of a
Jewish Commonwealth.
As a Senator, Truman had more than once expressed
his concern for Jewish immigration into Palestine. He
strongly condemned the 1939 British White Paper. "It has
made a scrap of paper out of Lord Balfour's promise to the
Jews. It has just added another to the long list of sur-
renders to the Axis powers," he told the Senate. He
described it as "Munich Mentality," and a dishonorable
repudiation by Britain of her obligations. In May 1944, he
had been approached by the Washington Bureau of the Zionist
Organization of America to make a statement supporting the
Palestine Resolution at that time before Congress.'
The Resolution called for unrestricted Jewish immi-
gration to Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish
Commonwealth, and promised Congressional action to that end
after the War.^ In his statement Senator Truman pointed
out that as a member of the Resolution Sub-Committee at the
Democratic National Convention, he had assisted in drafting
^Harry S. Truman, May 25, 19 39. U.S. Congressional
Record, V.O. 84, Part B. (76th Congress, 1st Session),
p. 2231.
^Letter of May 2, 1944, Palestine file, Truman Sena-
torial Papers, Truman Library. In writing to Truman they
were prompted by his "...sympathy and support for the move-
ment to open the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration..."
^The resolution read "We favor a free and unrestricted
immigration of Jews to Palestine, and such a policy as to
result in the settlement there of a free and democratic Jewish
commonwealth," loc. cit.
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the Palestine plank of the Democratic platform adopted at
the Convention. He was utterly appalled at the tragic
experiences of the Jewish people of Europe, and that plank
reflected his personal opinion, he said.
The remainder of Truman's statement is of great
significance. It clearly outlined his view of the problem,
and the basic approach he took towards it:
I am of the opinion that a resolution such as this
should be very circumspectly handled until we know
just exactly where we are going and why. With the
difficulties looming up between Russia and Poland,
and the Baltic States and Russia, and with Great
Britain and Russia, it is absolutely necessary to
us in financing the war.
He ended on a far more prophetic note than he knew, "I don't
want to throw any bricks to upset the applecart, although
when the right time comes I am willing to help make the fight
for a Jewish homeland in Palestine."
These comments may have been simply politically pro-
fitable at the time; there were large concentrations of
Jews in both Kansas City and St. Louis. Yet a pro-Zionist
stand might have lost as many votes as it won in provincial
and isolationist Missouri. In view of this, and later
Zionist denxinciations accusing Truman of being a Pendergast
Machine politician, it is more likely that they accurately
defined his attitude.^
The end of fighting in Europe brought home the full
horror of the Jewish situation in Europe. Reaching a solu-
^This statement was attached to the letter of May 2,
referred to above.
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tion became even more urgent as the deadline for the British
ending of Jewish immigration to Palestine approached in Aug-
ust. Truman describes in his memoirs his mounting anxiety
and his steps to find an answer. On receiving Earl G.
Harrison's report, Truman wrote on August 31 to Clement
Attlee stressing the need for immediate action to permit
100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine as requested by the
Jewish Agency. But the British Prime Minister offered
little hope.
Between August and October 1945, the White House
received an increasing amount of mail requesting American
action to help the displaced persons. -^^ To his critics,
Truman's efforts seemed hardly enough. Zionist organiza-
tions, by their demands that the United States support
their aims for a Jewish state made the President's task
more difficult. He wrote in answer to one letter in Octo-
ber. "The Jewish and Arab situation in the Near East is a
most difficult one and has caused us more difficulty than
most any other problem in the European Theater." -^
'•^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II, pp. 163-5.
•'lln June, Truman had sent Harrison, Dean of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, to Europe to inves-
tigate the refugee problem, especially the situation of the
Jews. Harrison, in a moving report, urged that the proposal
of the Jewish Agency to admit 100,000 Jews be accepted.
Ibid
. , pp. 163-5,
^^See Appendix A, for density of mail.
^^Letter of Truman to Virginia C. Gildersleeve,
October 15, 1945, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
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In order to define his position more clearly in
relation to the political future of Palestine, Truman author-
ized the State Department to release Roosevelt's letter of
April 5, 194 5 to Ibn Saud. By so doing, he indicated United
States policy towards any "final decision" which might alter
the "basic situation", thus pointing out the limits within
which he had to act.l^ The release made it clear that the
President and the State Department were in substantial
agreement as to immediate action, and that they did not
regard the admittance of 100,000 Jews as changing the basic
situation. The following day, October 19, the British
Government formally proposed an Anglo-American inquiry into
the problems of Palestine. The President and Secretary of
State readily accepted the suggestion as a step forward.
When this decision was made public on November 13th,
Zionists strongly protested to Truman. Rabbis Stephen S.
Wise, and Hillel Silver telegraphed, "it was with deepest
regrets that we learned of the acceptance by our government
of the British proposal. "15 Th^y feit there was no reason
for any further investigation, it was just another stalling
device of the British. The New York Post described the
decision as an American betrayal to oil, imperialism and
Arabs-Lo — a theme it developed to an almost pathological
l^Roosevelt to Ibn Saud, April 5, 1945, loc. cit.
l^s. Wise to Truman, November 15, 1945. Weizmann
MSS, Truman Library.
l^New York Post
, November 17, 1945.
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degree over the next thirty months.
Democratic Congressmen, disturbed at the effect this
might have on their political futures, also protested the
American "capitulation to the British viewpoint" without any
valid reasons being given. ' Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee, Robert E. Hannegan, received a letter
from Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City pointing out "how
seriously the Jewish people look upon the Palestine Ques-
tion. "^^ Hague referred to the Zionist National Committee
meeting- held in Atlantic City late in November, which had
passed a resolution that they were "Disgusted and resentful
against President Truman and the State Department in their
actions towards the Jews."^^ obviously alarmed, Hannegan
sent this letter to Truman in the hope that the President
might take some action to allay this feeling.
Senator Wagner also thought that the Committee of
Inquiry was just a delaying tactic, and appealed to Trxaman
to exert more pressure on the British by supporting a Senate
20
Resolution favoring Palestine as a Jewish homeland. Truman
l^Emanuel Celler to Truman, November 15, 1945, O.F.
204, Truman Library. Celler wrote that the nation was
solidly behind the establishment of a Jewish State, and that
this delay did not appeal to the general public.
•'^Frank Hague to Robert E. Hannegan, November 26, •
1945, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
l^Ibid.
20wagner to Truman, December 6, 1945, O.F. 204, Tru-
man Library. Wagner was referring to Senate Resolution 112,
1945.
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offered Wagner little sympathy, and told him that he thought
21
the resolution should wait upon the findings of the Inquiry.
Some indication of the extent to which Truman saw
this as a non-political question, and his desire to solve the
problem of the Jewish refugees without involving considera-
tions as to the final political outcome in Palestine, can be
seen by his choice of the six Americans to take part in the
Inquiry. 22 as one of their members, former Under Secretary
of State William Phillips, wrote later, "I knew very little
about the Middle East, that is why I, indeed all the members
of our committee were chosen. "23 Truman hoped in this way
to obtain a fresh and unbiased approach to the whole problem.
In his account of the Commission, Hartley C. Crum who soon
became deeply and personally committed to the Zionist posi-
tion, complained of State Department pressure against reach-
2lTruman to Wagner, December 10, 1945, O.F. 204, Tru-
man Library. Truman wrote: "I believe that the appointment
of the Commission will serve a useful purpose, although I do
not intend to decrease my efforts to get some additional
Jews into Palestine in the meantime."
22The members of the committee were: Judge Joseph
C. Hutcheson, a highly respected Federal Judge from Texas,
who was designated the American Chairman; Dr. Frank Ayde-
lotte. Director for the Institute of Advanced study at
Princeton; Frank W. Buxton, editor of the Boston Herald; Wil-
liam Phillips, a veteran of our diplomatic service; James G.
McDonald, who had been the League of Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees; and 0. Max Garner, former Governor of North
Carolina. Mr. Garner was unable to accept the appointment,
and Hartley C. Crum, a California attorney took his place.
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 172.
^•^William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston:
Beacon, 1952), p. 421.
ing a decision too favorable to the Jews.^'* Criom, however,
was unusually sensitive on this matter.
The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry presented its
report to Truman on April 22, 1946. Only the following
points need be mentioned here: the Committee recommended the
immediate authorization of 100,000 certificates for Jewish
victims of Nazi persecution into Palestine. It felt that it
was essential, at the same time however, to make a clear
statement of the following principles: that Jew will not
dominate Arab and Arab will not dominate Jew in Palestine;
that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab
state; that the ultimate form of government to be estab-
lished, shall under international guarantees, fully protect
and preserve the interests of the Holy Land of Christendom
and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths. "^^ The Committee also
warned that any attempt to establish an independent Pales-
tine State or independent Palestinian States would result
in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the
world. It recommended, therefore, continuation of the Bri-
tish mandate and an eventual UN trusteeship.
A week later the President announced that he had
received the Committee's report, and made his own comments
upon it. Maintaining his position of keeping the final out-
^^Bartley C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1947), p. 31.
^^Joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry of
Palestine, O.F. 204 B, Truman Library.
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come separate from the refugee problem, Trioman readily
endorsed the recommendation for the admission of 100,000
immigrants. But he refused to commit himself concerning the
political future of Palestine other than to note that Arab
rights were protected, and he did not anticipate any change
in the basic situation. 26
Trimian did not wish to involve the United States in
the responsibility for enforcing any final settlement. "I
have no intention of attempting to assume the British
responsibility in Palestine," he wrote to Senator Walter E.
George, Chairman of the Committee on Finance, "my only inter-
est is to find some proper way to take care of these displaced
persons, not only because they should be taken care of and are
in a pitiful plight, but because it is in our own financial
interest to have them taken care of because we are feeding
most of them. "27 • .
Britain had been trying to get the United States to
accept joint responsibility for a policy towards Palestine
for some time. 28 Harold Laski put it bluntly in a letter to
Judge Mosk of California: "On Palestine, it would certainly
26public Papers. . .Harry S. Trxoman, 1946. Statement
April 30, 1945, pp. 218-19. His statement ended: "In addi-
tion to these immediate objectives the report deals with many
other questions of long range political policies and ques-
tions of international law which require careful study and
which I will take under advisement."
27Truman to Walter E. George, October 17, 1945, O.F.
204, Truman Library.
28New York Times , May 1, 1946. Article by James Res-
ton, Clippings File, Democratic National Committee, Truman
Library.
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make the task of the British Government easier if the Ameri-
cans would offer to share in the difficult responsibility
of our mandate instead of merely offering us advice by
resolution. 5,000 American troops in Palestine are worth
100 resolutions from the United States Senate. "^^ The basic
difference of opinion was whether 100,000 Jews could be sent
into Palestine without force. The British were hesitant,
while Truman believed that it was possible without bloodshed.
For this reason, he wished to press ahead with immigration,
and offered ships and finance for this purpose. But, he
refused to become involved in a settlement of the question
with the possibility of military support.
Zionist pressure increased considerably during the
following six months and the President's actions have been
interpreted as responses to this pressure. Particularly
singled out for attack was his treatment of the Morrison Plan
and his Yom Kippur statement issued on October 4. James Res-
ton of the New York Times wrote on October 7; "Domestic poli-
tics in general and the New York State campaign in particu-
lar are generally believed here to be the reason why Mr.
Trioman opposed publication of the Cabinet Committee's federa-
tion plan and why he insisted on putting out his Palestine
statement on Friday. "^O A closer examination of this inter-
29naj.old Laski to Mosk, October 10, 1945, O.F. 204,
Truman Library.
30New York Times , October 7, 19 46, Clippings File,
Democratic National Committee, Trioman Library.
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val reveals however, that while this was undoubtedly a fac-
tor, Truman was concerned with, and motivated by, far more
than domestic politics.
The British response to the Anglo-American report
was to refuse to act on any of the recommendations until
Jewish terrorism ceased in Palestine and the political
future of the country had been decided. Bevin's announce-
ment to this effect, although it expressed his support for
an eventual Jewish state, was greeted unenthusiastically by
American Jews. For the remainder of the year, discussions
took place between the two countries in which America tried
to modify the British attitude towards the refugees and at
the same time find a political solution acceptable to both
Arabs and Jews. For this purpose Truman appointed a cabi-
net committee comprising the Secretaries of State, War and
Treasury. Under Alternate Henry F. Grady, acting for the
Secretary of State as chairman, the American committee left
for London in July to meet with a British Cabinet committee
headed by Lord Robert Morrison. 31 The British proposed
autonomous communities for the Arabs and the Jews under a
strong central government, which might lead eventually to a
bi-national federal state or partition. 32
31p.oj. the events and exchange of letters leading up
to the formation of the Anglo-American cabinet committee
discussions, see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, pp. 178-180.
Morrison, a Labour Party peer, had been on the A.A.C.I.
32Truman's statement of October 4, 1946, O.F. 204,
Trioman Library. Also printed in Public Papers. . .Harry S.
Truman, 1946, p. 442.
—
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This scheme, known as the Morrison Plan when it
became public at the end of July, was opposed by both Jews
and Arabs. The Jews regarded it as falling far short of
their promised statehood, and the Arabs would not accept
any proposal that envisaged a Jewish State in Palestine.
Truman was inclined to support the plan at first. His pri-
mary reason for doing so was Prime Minister Attlee's assur-
ance that if the proposal was adopted, Britain would reopen
Jewish immigration into Palestine immediately. Rabbi H.
Silver, spokesman for the Rabbinical Assembly of America,
condemned the proposal as un-American and a reversal of
earlier policy. The Rabbinical Assembly, he wrote to Tru-
man, was strongly opposed to it. 34
Protests came also from political quarters. 35
Paul E. Fitzpatrick, chairman of the Democratic State Com-
mittee of New York, claimed, "Looking only at the political
side of the question, if this plan goes into effect it would
be useless for the Democrats to nominate a State ticket for
the election this fall. I say this without reservation and
am certain that my statement can be substantiated. "36 There
33New York Times , October 6, 1946.
34h. Silver to Truman, July 31, 1946, O.F. 204, Tru-
man Library.
35Herbert H. Lehman, Governor of Masachusetts, tele-
gramed that he was horrified by the plan: "It was totally at
variance with American policy." Telegram to Truman, July 30,
1946, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
36paul E. Fitzpatrick to Truman, August 2, 1946, O.F.
204, Truman Library.
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had been, he said, a deeply emotional reaction by the Jew-
ish community. -^^ Hartley Crum wrote to the President warn-
ing that, from information he had gained while on the Anglo-
American Inquiry, the aim of the British government was to
destroy the Jewish national home. °
The British proposal as it stood clearly offered
little hope of easing the situation, and promised only fur-
ther violence. Alarmed at the reports of existing fighting,
Truman did not want to reach any final conclusions concern-
ing the future of Palestine which neither side would
accept. ^^ Accordingly he instructed the United States
delegation to continue the discussions. Writing a year
later to Judge Simmons of the Supreme Court of Nebraska,
Truman explained his reason for not going ahead with the
federation plan: "Neither the Jews nor the Arabs seemed to
^^joe T. Higgins, a New York Lawyer, wrote to the
National Democratic Committee, "We need all the help we can
get from the Jewish people who are pretty wrought up over
the Palestine question here. They think the President could
do more." Letter of July 11, 1946, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
38The British had an extraordinary plan if Crum is
to be believed. They proposed "one, to eliminate the Jewish
Agency in Palestine; two, to extirpate the Haganah; three,
to set up a so-called Democratic Commonwealth in Palestine
which in reality will be an Arab State, the head of which
will be the notorious Grand Mufti." Letter to Trvunan,
October 25, 1946, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
39in a press conference on August 9th, Truman denied
that he had received any specific recommendations from the
Grady mission. Public Papers. . .Harry S. Truman, 1946.
Press Conference, August 9th, 1946, p. 410.
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want it."'*° In a statement released on August 16, Truman
clarified his position when he wrote: "Although the Presi-
dent has been expressing views with Mr. Attlee on the sub-
ject, this Government has not presented any plan of its
own for the solution of the problem of Palestine." He went
on to say:
It is clear that no settlement of the Palestine prob-
lem can be achieved which will be fully satisfactory
to all of the parties concerned and that if this prob-
lem is to be solved in a manner which will bring peace
and prosperity to Palestine, it must be approached in
a spirit of conciliation. ^'
In answer to a further question on the subject at a
press conference on September 5, Truman said that all the
negotiations had been made public and were still in prog-
ress. "All I was trying to do," he said, "was get a hundred
thousand Jews into Palestine. [I am] still trying to do
that. "42 A letter of Truman's to McDonald suggests, how-
ever, that he was not very hopeful. "It has been a most
difficult problem and I have reached the conclusion that
there is no solution, but we will keep trying. "^-^
^^Letter to Simmons, June 9, 1947, O.F. 204, Trximan
Library. Triiman refers to a similar letter in his memoirs.
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 181.
^^Public Papers. . .Harry S. Truman, 1946, p. 421.
'^^Ibid. Press conference, September 5, 1946, p. 424,
^^Truman to McDonald, July 31, 1946, O.F. 204, Tru-
man Library. McDonald had written to Truman encouraging
him to continue his efforts.
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Britain, meanwhile, was conferring with the Arabs
and Jews, trying to reach some agreement. The Jewish Agency
of Palestine, official spokesman for the Zionists, pre-
sented to Britain and America a proposal for partition
whereby a Jewish state would be established within Pales-
tine. In the hope that out of this a solution would emerge
which, even if not fully acceptable to both sides, might
possibly be implemented without gravely endangering the
peace of Palestine and the Middle East, Truman passed the
proposal on to the British with his approval.
At this stage the British did not believe that the
Arabs would go as far as open warfare in Palestine. "The
Arabs are practical people," said British Ambassador Lord
Inverchapel to Eliahu Epstein,'*'^ "when they were faced with
a fait-accomplis they will make the best of it that they can
from a Jewish state. "'^5 This feeling was shared in the
White House. David Niles, Presidential Assistant to both
Truman, and Roosevelt wrote in a memorandum to Truman in
May, that he could discount the danger of violence from a
unified Arab world "because a good part of the Moslem world
follows Ghandi and his philosophy of non resistance." He
also added this interesting comment; "President Roosevelt
'^'^Eliahu Epstein was the Washington representative
for the Jewish Agency.
'^^Epstein to Nahum Goldman, Jewish Agency, London,
October 9, 1946. Weizmann MSS, Truman Library.
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said to some of us privately he could do anything that
needed to be done with Ibn Saud with a few million dol-
lars. '"^^ Still skeptical, but slightly reassured by this
misinformation, Truman agreed to approve the proposal as
the basis for negotiation.
The Washington office of the Jewish Agency, aware
of the importance attached by the Democratic Party to
retaining Jewish support in the approaching Congressional
election, began to put pressure on the White House for a
Presidential statement which would publicly announce Ameri-
can support of the partition proposal. The Agency hoped
that a statement/ addressed to Chaim Weizmann indicating
United States approval of the plan, would lead to its
acceptance at the London conference which was still in ses- *
sion. Epstein, in a letter to the Agency's London office
describing the events leading up to the President's state-
ment, relates that Rabbi Stephen Wise visited the President
in September and convinced Truman, who was by this time
disillusioned by the way things had gone since July, to
issue a statement. Epstein wrote:
The last but not the least factor in the situation
was the activity of the Republican candidates in the
forthcoming elections, and especially in New York,
who overtly showed their determination to make the
Palestine issue one of the focal points of attack
on Truman and the Democratic administration. '^'7
"i^David Niles to Truman, May 27, 1946, O.F. 204,
Truman Library.
^"^Epstein to Goldman, October 9, 1946. Weizmann
MSS, Truman Library. In this letter Epstein re-
39
Truman's statement, issued on the eve of Yom Kip-
pur, was interpreted by the press and congressmen, as the
agency had hoped it would be, as a shift in American policy
to support of partition as a solution. ^^ New York Democratic
Congressman Immanuel Celler wrote enthusiastically to Truman
congratulating the President on his statement, adding, "It
should also have the very desirable political effect upon
our chances in New York."
The statement, although designed and timed to assist
the Democrats in the elections, did not, however, indicate
any departure in United States policy or any shift in Tru-
man's position. "It is merely a reiteration of the policy
I have been urging since August 1945" Truman wrote to Celler,
"but it was necessary to make [it] at this time."^! In the
statement, the President expressed his regret at the adjourn-
lates in some detail the drafting of the statement. Ep-
stein's original draft was considerably altered by the State
Department Near Eastern Officer, Loy Henderson, and only
after considerable effort by a 'friend' in the White House,
probably Niles, was a compromise reached. A significant
factor also was a letter of Democratic National Chairman,
Hannegan, pointing out that Dewey was going to make a speech
and the need for Truman to do likewise. Some of, this, at
least, was generally known as Drew Pearson gave "the inside
story" over the radio. Philadelphia Record, October 11,
1946, Press Cutting File, Democratic National Committee
File, Truman Library.
^^Yom Kippur is the Jewish day of Atonement.
"^^Ne^ York Herald Tribune, October 5, 1946. Phila-
delphia Record, October 11, 1946.
^^Celler to Truman, October 7, 1946, O.F. 204, Tru-
man Library.
^^Truman to Celler, October 10, 1946, O.F. 204, Tru-
man Library (emphasis mine)
.
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ment of the London conference. Reviewing the two propo-
sals under discussion, the Morrison plan and the partition
plan of the Jewish Agency, he asserted, "I cannot believe
that the gap between the proposals which have been put for-
ward is too great to be bridged by men of reason and good
will. . .
.
To such a solution our government could give its
support. "^2 He repeated the urgency of reaching some con-
clusions speedily and added, "should a workable solution
for Palestine be devised, I would be willing to recommend
to the Congress a plan for economic assistance for the
development of that country." Epstein recognized the
President's position only too well. In the letter to Nahum
Goldman referred to above he wrote:
After the publication of the statement, I found it
necessary to frankly express to our friend disap-
pointment over some parts of it, especially where
it comes out for "bridging of the gap" between our
plan and the Morrison Plan, instead of supporting
our plan completely . ^3
He pointed out, however, "that not a single newspaper has
pointed up this part of the statement and all the headlines
carried by the papers read "Truman's support of a Jewish
State." Epstein described Reston's New York Times article
which queried the extent to which domestic politics was
influential in this statement as "vicious."
Domestic politics had indeed been brought into the
^^Truman, October 4, 1946, loc . cit . , (emphasis mine)
^
-^Epstein to Goldman, loc . cit .
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Palestine issue, and the press. Congressmen and Zionist
organizations made sure that it remained an ever present
factor in the mind of the public, the Democratic National
Committee and Harry S. Truman. The President, however,
never lost sight of the broad implications of the Palestine
question on his foreign policy. When in the next nine
months he moved to a position of supporting the establish-
ment of the State of Israel, it was not for reasons of
domestic politics or his dislike of the "striped pants
boys" of the State Department as his critics claimed. It
was more his desire to settle the problem of the displaced
Jews of Europe as peacefully as possible, and the expecta-
tion of securing stability in the region.
In the years following the end of the war it was the
immediate purpose of American foreign policy to create poli-
tical and economic stability in Europe. By the end of 1946
it had become apparent that Great Britain was unable to carry
on her commitments to Greece and Turkey. Russian intentions
in Eastern Europe were becoming increasingly more obvious,
and Trviman saw the urgency of decisive American action to
prevent the remainder of the area falling under Russian domi-
nation. Already by 1947 Communists held top positions in
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, Hungary, Ru-
mania and Bulgaria. Britain announced that she would have
to end her economic and military aid to Greece by the end
of March. Truman responded immediately with his March 12
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message to Congress outlining the Truman Doctrine. The
implications of this policy were not long in following. On
June 5, Secretary of State Marshall proposed the European
Recovery Program designed to bring economic and political
stability to Europe. The declaration and implementation of
these two policies committed the United States directly to
the protection of Greece, Turkey and Iran. The announced
American intention was to contain Communist aggression
everywhere.
In a real and immediate way the Middle East became
of vital significance to the United States. If the efforts
in Europe were to be successful, a stable Middle East was
essential. Control of the region's oil was a serious con-
sideration in ensuring the continuation and completion of
American foreign policy aims. The President realized that
outbreaks of violence, or the existence of American troops
in Palestine would result in repercussions far more wide
reaching than the local difficulties.
Consequently, Truman did not commit himself to any
particular formula for Jewish Statehood or set of circum-
stances. Throughout this period, Truman's primary and very
real concern was the fate of the Jewish refugees remaining
in Europe. His energies were directed towards the solution
of this problem rather than the exact nature of any Jewish
National Home in Palestine. In his statement on August 16,
1946, Truman had asserted: "It is also evident that the
solution of the Palestine question will not in itself solve
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the broader problem of the hundreds of thousands of dis-
placed persons in Europe." He added that he had been giving
this subject his special attention. He hoped that countries
outside Europe, including the United States, would admit
those in this plight as permanent residents. ^^ He repeat-
edly emphasized this as his main concern in finding a solu-
tion to the problems confronting Palestine.
Truman made his position very clear in a letter to
Ibn Saud on October 28. The Arab King had written to the
President angrily accusing him of breaking his promises to
the Arabs in his speech of October 4. Truman first drew the
attention of Ibn Saud to the tragic situation of the survi-
vors of Nazi persecution, and pointed out that the United
States had a considerable responsibility for the fate of
the people liberated at the end of the war.
The United States, which contributed its blood and
resources to the winning of the war, could not
divest itself of a certain responsibility for the
manner in which the freed territories were disposed
• of, or for the fate of the people liberated at that
time. It took the position, to which it still ad-
heres, that these people should be prepared for self
government and also that a national home for the
Jewish people should be established in Palestine.
It was only natural, therefore, Truman wrote, "that this
government should favor at this time the entry into Pales-
tine of considerable numbers of displaced Jews in Europe,
not only that they may find shelter there, but also that
^"^Public Papers Harry S. Truman, 1946, p. 421.
^^Public Papers. .. .Harry S. Truman, 1946, pp. 467-69,
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they may contribute their talents and energies to the up-
building of the Jewish National Home." The President, after
tracing his efforts to gain the admittance of 100,000 Jews
into Palestine, commented hopefully: "I sincerely believe
that it will prove possible to arrive at a satisfactory
settlement of this refugee problem along the lines which I
have mentioned above." Truman told Ibn Saud that he did not
regard this position as a contradiction to earlier promises
made to him. "I do not consider that my urging of the
admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into
Palestine or my statements with regard to the solution of
the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action
hostile to the Arab people." Truman still had not committed
himself to any specific proposal by February 1947. \ He wrote
to Washington Attorney, Hurton Thompson: "I wish we could
find a solution — we have been trying to find one since
July 1945, but we seem no nearer to the solution now than
then. I regret it very much. It was the failure of the
Zionists to realize this that led them to accuse the Presi-
dent of betrayals and reversals in his Palestine policy.
They hoped by this method to create enough political pressure
to force Tr\iman to support their own political aims for the
future of Palestine. In the course of the events of the
next nine months Truman took the stand of support for the
partitioning of Palestine. But it had little to do with pres-
sure of domestic politics that led him to this decision.
^^Truman to Thompson, February 25, 1947, O.F. 204,
Truman Library.
CHAPTER III
UNITED NATIONS PARTITION AND AMERICAN RECOGNITION
It was evident to the British long before January
1947, that Palestine was no longer a Colonial or Foreign
Office problem, but an international one.-"- They had failed
to get United States responsibility to any larger degree,
and they could not get any agreement between the Arabs or
Jews on the three alternatives offered; an Arab State, a
Jewish State or a Federated State. The London Palestine
Conference which resumed on January 25, after its adjourn-
ment early in October, showed no sign of reaching agreement,
and on February 18, Bevin with little other alternative,
announced Britain's decision to submit the matter to the
United Nations. , .-
j f / ' 'i i
The General Assembly, in its first regular session,
agreed to the British request for a Special Session to con-
sider the problem. This Special Session of the General Assem-
bly, the first such, was convened three weeks later in New
York on April 28. It quickly appointed a United Nations
•'Bevin suggested this as early as June 1946 in his
speech charging that the United States was willing to give
advice but little assistance. Washin(^ton Post , June 13,
1946. Clippings file, Democratic National Committee ,
Truman Library.
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Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) of eleven Nations
on a fact-finding mission to report to the second regular
session in September. By this move, Britain forced the
American Government into accepting at least some of the
responsibility for the future of Palestine.
The significance of this was not lost on either
President Truman or those interested in a favorable outcome
for the Jews. Truman felt that this was the kind of problem
for which the United Nations was intended.^ He was acutely
aware that if the UN was to become an effective agent for
peace, and an instrument through which United States policy
might be implemented, it was essential it succeed in this
first major international dispute. For these reasons he was
determined to support any resolution passed by the General
Assembly which it was able to enforce. The role of the
United States was no longer advisory, it was now committed
to finding and assisting in carrying out a solution. For
this reason, also, the President was subjected to intense
pressure in the months leading up the UN decision.
Zionist pressure was applied at the outset with
renewed vigor. The American delegate at the United Nations,
Herschel Johnson, in the opening meeting of the Special Com-
^The nations on the committee were Australia, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru,
Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Justice Emil Sandstrom of
Sweden was chairman.
^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II, p. 166.
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mittee indicated that the United States would do little more
than support any majority resolution passed, and he stressed
that the criteria for American support was that the decision
be enforceable with the machinery at the disposal of United
Nations. The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) regarded
this as, "utterly at variance with the attitude of our
Government throughout a whole generation.'"* But as Walter
Lippmann pointed out in his 'Today and Tomorrow' column in
the Washington Post , the only thing the United Nations could
really do in its present form, was guarantee a lawful poli-
tical boundary line. Since this was the best kind of inter-
national enforcement, he regarded partition was almost the
only logical outcome.^ The ZOA and other Zionist groups
were concerned that the Jewish Agency was not permitted to
take part in Assembly discussions and they petitioned the
President to support their efforts to remedy this.
Similar pressure came from Congress. Senator Wagner
telegrammed early in May reminding Trviman once more that the
United States was committed to a Jewish State through reso-
lutions passed in both houses. He urged the President to
^Wise to Truman, April 30, 1947, O.F. 204, Truman
Library. The "Nation" Associates also expressed their sur-
prise at the "contradictory" policy of the U.S. They saw
the United Nations statement as coming from the State Depart-
ment and urged that Truman to deal with the matter himself.
'Nation' to Truman May 5, 1947, O.F. 204, Truman Library
Washington Post, May 3, 1947. Democratic National
Committee Press Cutting File, Truman Library.
actively support Israel in the United Nations, allow Jewish
immigration into Palestine and enable the Jews to be repre-
sented at the General Assembly.^ Telegrams expressing
identical sentiments were received from the Governors of
almost all the states.' .'
As the British tried to maintain order, the drama-
tic events taking place in Palestine between May and Septem-
ber gave Zionists all that they needed to arouse public and
political support for their case.^ The White House received
a flood of telegrams and letters protesting the violence of
the British and indignation at what was termed the "mon-
strous indifference" of the United States towards these acts.
Truman, disturbed that the deteriorating situation
in Palestine might prejudice an early settlement, spoke out
in June against the terrorism taking place, although he had
been warned by Marshall, "that the issuance of such an appeal
might be unwelcome to certain groups in this country who are
actively engaged in facilitating immigration into Palestine
in violation of the laws of that country and in encouraging
^Wagner to Truman, May 5, 1947, O.F. 204, Truman
Library.
^Some of the more persuasive letters came from Gover-
nors Blue of Iowa, Donnelly of Missouri, Turner of Oklahoma,
Green of Illinois, Carlson of Kansas, Tuck of Virginia.
^The "Exodus 1947" episode, in which several Jews
were killed as the British seized the refugee ship on July 18
to prevent it landing in Palestine, created a wave of Anglo-
phobia throughout the country. Letters came in from the
American Jewish Conference, Bnai Brith, the Jewish War Vet-
erans and many prominent Jewish leaders appealing for some
presidential action as a protest against this action.
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the activities of terrorists."^ Rabbi Baruch Korff of the
Political Action Committee for Palestine, one of the organi-
zations referred to in the above memorandiom, accused the
State Department of aiding the avalanche of Anti-Semitism in
the United Nations, and appealed to Triiman to put a stop to
this support of the British. ^^
These demands became so strident and insistent that
Truman, by now thoroughly annoyed, wrote to Wise after one
such telegram: "I read your telegram with a great deal of
interest and appreciate your viewpoint, but there seems to
be two sides to this question. I am finding it rather diffi-
cult to decide which one is right and a great many other
people in the country are beginning to feel just as I do."^
The Special Committee on Palestine presented its
report to the General Assembly when it met for its second
regular session on September 1. Although the Committee had
not reached unanimous findings, a majority — Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and
Uruguay — recommended the partition of Palestine into
^Undated memorandum from GCM (George C. Marshall) to
Truman accompanying a draft of the statement issued by the
President on June 5, 1947, O.F. 771, Tr\aman Library.
l^Rabbi Baruch Korff, to Truman, May 1, 1947, O.F.
204, Truman Library. Korff said that the United States
stand at the United Nations was tantamount to a disavowel of
earlier policies.
llTruman to Wise, August 6, 1947, O.F. 204, Truman
Library.
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Jewish and Arab states. A minority — Indian, Yugoslavia and
Iran suggested a single Federal state. Two days later the
Assembly designated itself an Ad Hoc Committee to consider
the two proposals. All members of the United Nations were
represented on the Committee. Between September 25 and
November 25, the Ad Hoc Committee held thirty four meetings.
Both the Jewish Agency and the Arab High Committee were
given the opportunity of being heard.
During this interval, the pressure on Truman to
intervene directly to gain a partition vote became frantic.
The President's decision not to make any public comment at
this stage caused considerable alarm to supporters of the
partition plan. It was, said the American Christian Pales-
tine Committee of New York; "a shameful mockery of the prom-
ises that had been given the Jews."-^^ In addition to that
from Jewish groups, a good deal of pressure came from Demo-
cratic Committees throughout the country, especially as
could be expected, in the areas of high Jewish population
concentration of New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island. ^^
l^American Christian Palestine Committee of New York
to Truman, October 15, 1947, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
^^Senator Howard McGrath, Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee and Gael Sullivan, Publicity Officer, both
forwarded telegrams to Truman that they had received. The
Democratic Chairman of the New Haven Committee wrote to
Sullivan: "It is imperative that the administration take an
unequivocal and strong stand in favor of UNSCOP majority
report on Palestine." Telegram of October 9, O.F. 204,
Truman Library. v ^.
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The Palestine issue was now being placed, in these
telegrams, within the broader framework of American policy
in relation to Communism and the Middle East. "If it is the
aim of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan to protect
our Western way of life from the encroachment of totali-
tarianism and Communism, a free Jewish state in Palestine
would be symbolic of our fidelity as a nation to this pro-
gram."!^ A Jewish state established by America, its sup-
porters predicted, would be a bastion of democracy in the
Middle East, a symbol of the fidelity of American promises,
and a clear indication of the role of world leadership
America was to assume. These arguments, whether simply
used by Zionists as propagandistic pressure on the White
House or not, influenced Truman much more than those sug-
gesting the political expediency of gaining Jewish votes.
Truman expressed his views frankly to long standing friend
Rabbi Thurman. Thurman who was certainly not a Zionist,
defended Truman against the charges levelled at him that the
predominant motivation of his action was consideration of
domestic politics. Trximan responded with these words of
thanks: "I told you exactly how I felt with regard to the
world situation and I am certainly pleased to have gotten
it over with you."-^^
Essex County Democratic Committee, Newark, N.J. to
Truman, October 7, 1947, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
^^Truman to Thurman, November 8, 1947, O.F, 204,
Trvunan Library.
52
Little had been done, however, to work out any com-
prehensive American policy in relation to the Palestine
question. Differences of opinion emerged between the Presi-
dent and the State Department during the three months that
the matter was debated before the United Nations over the
degree to which America should support the United Nations
Palestine proposals, without endangering her broad foreign
policy considerations. Over the basic issue there was little
dispute, but the State Department emphasized the need for
Arab friendship and oil concessions, while Truman's primary
concern was the welfare of the Jewish refugees, and inter-
national justice.
It was Eddy Jacobson, a figure hitherto neglected
by historians of this episode of American foreign policy,
who -was most responsible for bringing President Truman to
the conviction that the United States should support the
majority report of the UNSCOP without reservations or modifi-
cations. Eddy Jacobson was for many years one of Harry S.
Truman's closest friends. Yet little is known of him, or
the role he played in the foundation of the Jewish State.
He appears only briefly in the President's memoirs. Truman
relates their World War I experiences and their subsequent
unhappy venture in haberdashery in the early 1920 's.-'-' The
•'-^This information on Jacobson which follows is the
result of an interview by this writer with A. J. Granoff,
and letters which Granoff has in his possession. Some of
this information appeared in two articles in the Kansas
City Times , May 13, 1965. • -
^ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , I, pp. 153-55.
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warmth of their friendship is evident, however, even from
these brief comments of Truman's. "Eddy Jacobson was as
fine a man as ever walked," he wrote. The President further
revealed their closeness on Jacobson 's death in October, 1955.
Visibly shaken after having been called to Jacobson 's house
in the middle of the night, Truman stated the following morn-
ing: "Eddie was one of the best friends I had in this world.
He was absolutely trustworthy. I don't know how I am going
to get along without him."-^^ Truman also later recorded:
And when the day came when Eddie Jacobson was per-
suaded to forego his natural reluctance to petition
me and he came to talk to me about the plight of the
Jews and the struggles confronting the State of
Israel then being formed — I paid careful attention.
Although my sympathies were already active and pre-
sent in the cause of the State of Israel, it is a
fact of history that Eddie Jacobson 's contribution
was of decisive importance.-'-^
Truman's memoirs describe Eddie's visit to him in
February of 194 8, and note was taken of this at the time by
Drew Pearson. ^^ But Jacobson had been recruited as early as
June 1947. The non-Zionist organization B'nai B'rith, had
approached Jacobson to seek Truman's help in assisting the
refugees interned on Cyprus. Frank Goldman, National Presi-
dent, and Maurice Bisgyer, National Vice-President, were
introduced to Jacobson in Kansas City by his friend and
lawyer A. J. Granoff.^-"- Jacobson agreed to speak to Truman.
•^^New York Times , October 26, 1955.
^^Statement read by A. J. Granoff for H. Truman, May
22, 1965, in Tel Aviv.
20Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II, o. 189.
^^Kansas City Times article. May 13, 1965.
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Between June and November, Eddie made several visits to the
President, sometimes alone and sometimes with Granoff.
Eddie's pleas for the Jewish refugees were received by a
sympathetic listener. Truman's grandparents had been up-
rooted during the Civil War, and had been forced to move to
Missouri. From their reminiscences the President had
gained some insight and understanding of the dislocation and
misery associated with being a displaced person.
Under Granoff 's guidance, Jacobson who had little
formal education, soon came to realize the significance of
Palestine as a future Jewish homeland, and the importance of
American support for the UNSCOP partition recommendation in
gaining this end. At first his primary concern remained the
problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine. But he did not
fail to stress in his visits to the President during October
and November, the value to American interests of the presence
of a democratic state in the Middle East.^^
Secretary of State Marshall in his opening address
to the Assembly on September 1 had cautiously indicated,
without making a definite commitment, that the United States
gave great weight to the majority report. This attitude was
reconfirmed by American representative, Herschel V. Johnson,
on October 11. ^^ Truman maintained his position of support
22The B'nai B'rith President, F. Goldman, stressed
this aspect in a telegram of September 29, 1947. O.F. 204,
Truman Library. i .
"^•^New York Times , October 12, 1947. Press Cutting
File, Democratic National Committee, Truman Library,
.'
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for partition, as consistent with his overall foreign policy
concepts. The State Department, however, had reservations
over the partition boundaries as outlined in the majority
report. These divisions were a testimonial to the perplexity,
sincerity and ingenuity of its authors. But Marshall had
hoped that the Negev would remain under Arab control. This
would leave open the possibility of later negotiation for an
oil pipeline directly to the Mediterranean sea through
Jaffa. He proposed consequently that the boundaries be re-
drawn to gain this end, and urged Trviman not to agree to
those of the UNSCOP report. ^^
The news that such a modification to the partition
boundaries was under consideration by the State Department
aroused considerable concern among the Jewish leaders. ^5
Nevertheless it did not represent, any fundamental shift in
Truman's support for partition, although Zionists in their
efforts to bring added pressure on the President portrayed
it as such.
Jacobson played a key role in the deliberations that
took place on this boundary question. He discussed it with
Truman on several of his unofficial and unpublicized visits
to Washington. And he was instrumental in bringing Chaim
Weizmann, the Grand Old Man of the Jews, to the White House.
24e. Manuel, p. 133.
^^The Palestine Resistance Committee, and other Jewish
organizations telegrammed Truman protesting vigorously this
"shocking shift" of his stand. O.F. 204, Truman Library.
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Weizmann and Jacobson pointed out the importance of the
Negev area to the economic development of the proposed
Jewish State. Already, they explained, small self-contained
villages had been established. It was essential if the
country was to absorb the vast number of immigrants that the
land be available to the Jews for settlement and develop-
ment. ^^ Such schemes were not new to Truman. Franklin D.
Roosevelt had been deeply interested in the possibilities
of agricultural and industrial developments in Palestine. 27
Economic assistance for such projects had always occupied a
28
central place in Truman's hopes for Palestine. They pre-
vailed upon the President not to allow Marshall's proposed
modification. Truman acted directly. He instructed the
American Ambassador to the United Nations, Warren Austin, to
29
accept the boundaries recommended by the majority report.
The Ad Hoc Committee finally accepted the majority
report as it stood, and the General Assembly met at Flushing
•^^Interview with A. J. Granoff , Kansas City, August
22, 1965.
27f. Manuel, p. 316.
28h. Truman, Memoirs , II, p. 184. Truman's interest
in the development of Palestine can be seen in almost all
his public statements on the problem. As early as April 30,
1946, he wrote when speaking of the Anglo-American inquiry:
"It is also gratifying that the report envisages the carry-
ing out of large scale economic developments in Palestine
which would facilitate further immigration and be of benefit
to the entire population." Letter of Truman to D. ACheson,
O.F. 204, Truman Library.
29A. Lilienthal, p. 70.
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Meadows, Queens, to take the final vote. The date set was
November 26, and after a series of delaying adjournments,
balloting took place on the 29th. By a vote of 33-13, with
10 abstentions, the proposal to partition Palestine into an
Arab state and a Jewish state with economic union, was
30passed with the necessary two-thirds majority.
The role played by the United States, and President
Truman, in securing this outcome is another question which
remains disputed. Such a result was not indicated by the
last votes of the Committee.^-'- There is no doubt that a
great deal of lobbying took place to gain the vital extra
support for partition: only twenty hours before the ballot
took place there was considerable uncertainty as to how suc-
cessful this attempt would be.32 The question is who was
responsible for the lobbying?
Sumner Welles, in We Need Not Fail attributes it
directly to the instigation of the White House: "By direct
order of the White House every form of pressure, direct and
30A.Lilienthal, p. 62.
3lAt the concluding meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee
the partition plan passed by a vote of 25-13 with 17 absten-
tions. If delegates did not change their minds, partition
was 1 vote short of the two-thirds necessary. A Lilienthal,
p. 57.
32partition proponents were shocked to learn on No-
vember 2 7 that the Philippines and Haiti, who had both ab-
stained from voting on the Ad Hoc Committee would vote in
the negative. It was at these two countries that most pres-
sure was directed. A Lilienthal, pp. 60-61.
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indirect was brought to bear by American officials upon the
countries outside the Moslem world that were known to be
either uncertain or opposed to partition. "^^ The press also
shared this view: "It was the Truman administration that
took the lead in securing United Nations approval of parti-
tion, pushing through the partition against considerable
opposition. "^^
Truman in his memoirs denies any such action, and
there is considerable evidence to support his contentions.
The President was certainly under pressure to act directly
to gain support for partition. "The facts were", he writes,
that not only were there pressure movements around
the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen
there before but that the White House, too, was sub-
jected to a constant barrage. .. .The persistence of a
few of the extreme Zionist leaders — activated by
political motives and engaging in political threats
— disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggest-
ing that we pressure sovereign nations into, favorable
votes in the General Assembly. ^5
Congressman E. Celler of New York was one who urged this
course of action on the President. On November 26 he wrote
to Truman asserting that such action was necessary to prevent
all the previous good work going to waste "by a failure to
II 3fi
gain sufficient votes in the Assembly on this matter.
33s\amner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston, 1948), p.
63.
34wall Street Journal , February 26, 1948. Democratic
National Committee Clipping File, Truman Library.
^^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 186.
^^Celler to Trioman, November 26, 1947, O.F. 204,
Trvunan Library.
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This kind of direct approach, Truman writes, "could never
gain my support." He did not approve, he said, of the
strong imposing their will upon the weak, and this included
compelling nations "to vote with us on the partitioning of
Palestine or any other matter. "37 ,
It was the Zionist leaders themselves who seem to
have done most of the lobbying. Emanuel Neumann wrote
later: "Every clue was meticulously checked and pursued.
Not the smallest or remotest of nations but was contacted
and wooed. Nothing was left to chance. "38 Robert Lovett
commented on the pressure on the White House: "Never in
his life had he been subjected to as much pressure as he
had in the days beginning Thursday morning and ending Sat-
urday night." Jewish zeal was so intense he added, "that
it almost resulted in defeating the objective sought. "^9
The United States, Dean Rusk explained some months
later in a press conference, never exerted pressure on coun-
tries of the United Nations on behalf of one side or the
other. "Certain unauthorized officials and private persons
violated propriety and went beyond the law to exert such
pressure," he stated. "As a result partition was construed
as an American plan. "'^^
^^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs
, II, p. 187.
^^American Zionist , February 5, 1953,
39a. Lilienthal, p. 65.
^Q lbid
. , p. 67. Rusk at that time was director of
the State Department's Office of United Nations Affairs/
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The passage of the United Nations partition resolu-
tion in November virtually assured the emergence of a Jewish
State in Palestine. The resolution liquidated the mandate,
defined the legal framework in which the Yishuv could estab-
lish its state, and it gave to the Yishuv a definite goal
about which it could rally its forces. Passage of the reso-
lution was, however, merely the acceptance of a principle,
not a specific blueprint. This must be kept in mind when
considering the events of the next six months. As Truman
later wrote: "The way in which this principle might be
translated into action had yet to be found. It was my con-
stant hope that it would be a peaceful way."'*-^ He wrote to
former Secretary of the Treasury Henry E. Morganthau on
December 2, 1947:
I appreciated very much your telegram of November
twenty ninth but I wish you would caution all your
friends who are interested in the welfare of the Jews
in Palestine that now is the time for restraint and
caution and an approach to the situation in the future
that will allow a peaceful settlement. The vote in
the United Nations is only the beginning and the Jews
must now display tolerance and consideration for the
other people in Palestine with whom they will neces-
sarily have to be neighbors. ^^
The Yishuv, and the Arabs, realized that the success
or failure of the resolution depended upon themselves as much
as the United Nations decision. Before adjourning in Decem-
ber, the Assembly had formed a Commission to act as the
^^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II, p. 187.
42Tr\aman to Morganthau, December 2, 1947. Weiz-
mann, MSB, Truman Library.
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agency to carry out the plan. But nothing had been done to
secure or organize the forces necessarily required, and the
war in Palestine nullified these practical efforts.^^ The
United Nations made a somewhat half hearted and ineffectual
move to avoid violence by imposing an arms embargo on Pales-
tine. The United States agreed to this step; an action that
later brought Truman much abuse. '^'^ The President had hoped
in November, albeit faintly, that American support for par-
tition would discourage a violent Arab reaction to the pro-
posed new state, despite the threatening letter he had re-
ceived from Iraq in October. The Iraqi Senate had informed
Truman that it would never accept a Jewish state and that
such a move would destory the peace in the Middle East.^^
In view of the lack of any United Nations military
strength to support the partition plan, the Arabs felt secure
in carrying out their threats. Disorder, violence and blood-
shed erupted, with the British once more vainly attempting
to establish some rule of law. By mid-January, Palestine
was in chaos. Truman's worst fears had been realized. He
revealed his concern and anguish over the situation in a let-
ter to Senator Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico on February 10:
'^^N. Safran, p. 34.
^^This embargo went into effect on December 6,
1947. ^,
, i.^ ,y^ :..,•.:_: '
^^Letter from Iraqi Senate to Truman, October 6,
1947, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
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"The State Department and our representative at the United
Nations are making a most sincere effort to get this matter
properly ironed out. It has been a most difficult problem....
I hope that the situation will eventually work out. I've done
everything I possibly can to get a fair settlement and I am
46
still working on it."
The United Nations Palestine Committee reported the
worsening state of affairs to the Security Council on
February 16. It advised that an international police force
would be required to put partition into effect. The follow-
ing week, United States delegate, Austin told the Council
of American doubts as to the ability of the United Nations
to carry out partition. Austin did not formally present any
specific American alternatives for consideration, but his
comments revealed the President's dilemma on how to proceed
at that time. The United States, Austin said, was not pre-
pared to impose partition by force, but it would join any
United Nations efforts to safeguard international peace and
security. He suggested that the Big Five might work out the
nature of this effort.^'
Reports that the American position was being recon-
sidered came in mid-February. Throughout January there had
fears of a softening of the United States position because
^^Trviman to C. Hatch, February 10, 1948, O.F. 204,
Truman Library.
4"7f. Manuel, p. 344. Washington Post , February 27,
1948.
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of pressure of "Oil Interests." The silence of the Adminis-
tration and Secretary of State Marshall's refusal to discuss
the matter when questioned by the press early in February,
only encouraged rumors to this effect. "^^ Congressman Frank
Buchanan, Democrat of Pennsylvania, in an attempt to ease the
pressure made public a reassurance he had received from Truman.
The President reaffirmed to Buchanan his stand supporting the
United Nations. But he also expressed his anxiety at the
deterioration of the situation in Palestine. ^9 Truman did
little but add to the general uncertainty when he refused, on
the following day, to elaborate his attitude. ^^ The New York
Times correctly concluded from this that the partition pro-
posal was under discussion at the topmost policy levels. ^'-
Truman made another final appeal to the Arabs for pacifica-
tion, but it was rejected out of hand. There were signs
that they were planning massive military action towards the
CO
end of March. -^
Faced with this prospect, Truman agreed to Marshall's
suggestion that Palestine be placed under a temporary United Na-
tions trusteeship. He had little choice. If he stood by and did
^^The Nation , January 31, 1948. Also New York Herald
Tribune , February 13, 1948, Press Cutting File, Truman Library.
^^H. Truman to F. Buchanan, February 9, 1948, O.F.
204, Truman Library.
^Public Papers. .. .Harry S. Truman, 1948, Press Con-
ference, February / P-
^^New York Times , February 13, 1948.
^^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 188.
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nothing it seemed almost certain that the Jews would be dri-
ven into the sea. To suggest reopening the discussion of
the November settlement itself would be an admission of
defeat. And to take responsibility for enforcing partition
would mean sending American troops into Palestine. This was
not only highly impractical at that time, but risked serious
racial repercussions throughout America. ^-^ On the other
hand, an international police force drawn from the members
of the Security Council would result in the admission of
Russian troops into the Middle East. At a time when the
policy of containment was being formulated, this was to be
avoided at all costs. Austin's February 25 statement, made
in the midst of these considerations, reflected the Presi-
dent's uncertainty, and was little more than an attempt to
mark time until some satisfactory solution could be found»^>
The Wall Street Journal felt that Truman was partly
responsible for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in
Palestine. The Administration ought never to have supported
partition knowing that it would never send troops to back
it up, ran the editorial of February 26, 1948. All this was
the outcome of the Administration's use of Palestine for a
political football: "Mr. Truman wants and needs the Jewish
vote. Yet he knows that it would be political suicide to
get American troops into a shooting fray in Palestine. Hence
our shifting policies have been aimed at getting the one
53washington Post, February 27, 1948. Joseph and
Stewart Alsop's column "matter of fact" analyzed the Presi-
dent ' s predicament .
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without the other. In the vernacular, the Administration
wants to have its cake and eat it too."
President Triiman did not lack advice or political
pressure -during January and February, 1948. The editors of
The Nation , always pro-Zionist and bitterly critical of
State Department policy and personnel, were very busy.
Freda Kirchwey, in a series of violent letters warned Tru-
man of a "double cross" being planned by Loy Henderson of
the Near Eastern desk, the British and the Arabs to sabo-
tage the united Nations resolution. This, Kirchwey asserted
in a letter to Senator H. McGrath, would be tragic for Uni-
ted States honor, peace, security and, "in this crucial
election it dooms the chances of the President." She added
with a curious sense of logic that this, "apparently seemed
to the State Department a small price to pay for bringing
Palestine and the Middle East within the scope of the Trvmfian
Doctrine. "^^
Zionist leaders and Democratic committees continually
petitioned Truman to repeal the arms embargo, and to take
direct action to secure partition. Democrats urged him to
act for two reasons. It would be seen as following the
h\amanitarian tradition of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the
remarkable unity of political support of the Jews for the
^^Wall Street Journal, February 26, 194 8.
^^F. Kirchwey to H. McGrath, January 27, 1948. Mc-
Grath MSS, Truman Library.
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Democratic Party deserved more than just platitudes. Lift-
ing the arms embargo, they argued, would indicate to the
Arabs that America would not let their challenge to the
United Nations go unanswered. ^^ The Democratic Senator from
Minnesota, Hubert H. Humphrey, wrote to Triiman: "There are
forces trying to default on the partition decision even though
it would mean the breakdown of the United Nations. Our only
hope for world peace lies in the survival of the United Na-
tions. The reversal of the Palestine would mean the end of
that hope. 57 Exasperated by a particularly insistent letter
from the President of the St. Louis Council of the American
Jewish Congress, M. J. Slonin, Truman angrily replied:
One of our principle difficulties in getting the
Palestine matter settled... in the manner suggested
by the United Nations Commission on the same sub-
ject, has been that there are so many people in
this country who know more about how the situation
should be handled than do those in authority. It
has made the matter exceedingly difficult and is
not contributing in any manner to its solution.
Of course I appreciate the emotional feelings of you
and your friends. .. .However, the matter is now in the
hands of the United Nations and the United States is
making every effort to maintain the position of the
United Nations Commission. So much lobbying and out-
side interference has been going on in this question
that it is almost impossible to get a fair minded
approach to the subject. ^^
56r. Hughes to Congressman Mrs. M. Norton, February
12, 194 8. Richard Hughes was the chairman of the Mercer
County, N.J. Democratic Committee. Mrs. Norton forwarded
the letter to Truman. O.F. 204, Truman Library.
en
"H. Humphrey to Truman (and McGrath) , February 14,
1948, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
^^Truman to M. Slonin, March 6, 1948, O.F. 204, Tru-
man Library. • .•;
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Austin's speech had made it clear, however, that the
President was searching for an alternative. Truman relied
a great deal on the advice of Marshall whom he trusted im-
plicitly. He agreed consequently, to the Secretary of
State's plan for a temporary tripartite United Nations
trusteeship. 59 But Truman also had great faith in Jacob-
son, and once again he listened to his old partner.
It was essential to the success of the Yishuv, once
the British had announced their intention of terminating
their mandate on May 15, that partition not be abandoned by
the United Nations. Partition was in fact crystallizing in
Palestine. Both Jews and Arabs were, in a large degree,
obedient to their own institutions. The central British
administration was in a state of virtual collapse. The
Yishuv intended to proclaim the state of Israel on midnight
of May 14. But without continued American support for par-
tition this would be impossible.
Chaim Weizmann sailed from Palestine to put the Jew-
ish case before Truman. By this time, however, Truman re-
fused to discuss the matter with anybody. °^ Jewish leaders
realized that this might well be the turning point. B'nai
^^Marshall's plan involved a trusteeship adminis-
tered by Britain, France and the United States. The bulk
of the forces used would be those British forces already
in Palestine.
60Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II, p. 188. •
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B'rith President Frank Goldman once again went to Jacob-
son. ^'- He readily consented to intercede with Truman for
Weizmann. When, at first, he received a refusal from the
President to an appeal by letter, he decided to visit
Washington personally. On March 13 he went to the White
House. Jacobson described that visit later in a letter to
A. J. Granoff.^2
Although warned by Presidential Assistant, Matt
Connolly, not to do so, Jacobson went ahead and brought up
the matter of Weizmann 's visit. Truman responded angrily
that he had no intention of seeing the Jewish leader.
Jacobson, almost at the point of despair, made a final appeal
through the President's hero Andrew Jackson. Weizmann,
Jacobson said, was his hero just as Jackson was Truman's. He
was surprised that Truman refused to see him because of the
insults he had received at the hands of some of the American
Jewish leaders: "It doesn't sound like you, Harry, because
I thought that you could take this stuff they have been hand-
ing out. I wouldn't be here if I didn't know that if you
will see him you will be properly informed on the situation
6 3
as it exists in Palestine, and yet you refuse to see him."
^^Interview with A. J. Granoff , Kansas City, August
22, 1965. Kansas City Star , May 13, 1965.
^^This letter appears in a feature article on Jacob-
son and Granoff in the Kansas City Star , May 13, 1965.
^^E. Jacobson to A. Granoff, Ibid.
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Jacobson described Truman's reaction:
I don't know how many minutes passed in silence but
it seemed like centuries. All of a sudden he swiv-
eled around again, faced his desk, and looked me
straight in the eyes and said the most endearing
words I ever heard: "You win you bald headed ... I
will see him. Tell Matt to arrange this meeting as
soon as possible after I return from New York on
March 17."
.
Weizmann saw Truman on March 18. No account of the
meeting itself exists but the major points that Weizmann
emphasized may be learned from a letter he wrote to the
President shortly after this meeting. ^'^ Weizmann stressed
that abandonment of partition at a time when Palestine was
threatened by foreign Arab aggression, torn by internal war-
fare and already moving towards partition, would be disas-
trous. The problem of enforcing any United Nations deci-
sion would be made no easier by such a step. Nor was there
any assurance that an alternative was available. Arabs and
Jews appeared unlikely to accept or cooperate in instituting
a trusteeship, even if a trustee was available and the
General Assembly approved an agreement and could take effec-
tive steps before May 15. During the meeting the President
assured Weizmann that he would continue to support the par-
tition plan. He records in his Memoirs: "And when he
[Weizmann] left my office I felt that he had reached a full
understanding of my policy and that I knew what it was he
64c. Weilzmann to Truman, April 9, 1948, O.F. 204,
Truman Library.
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wanted. "65
On the following day, however, March 19, Austin
told the Security Council of the United States trusteeship
proposal. He called for suspension of all efforts towards
partition, for an iiranediate truce in Palestine and a special
session of the General Assembly, to meet early in April, to
approve United Nations trusteeship.
Austin's announcement, made as it was the day follow-
ing Weizmann's visit, considerably embarrassed Truman. Al-
though he had approved Marshall's suggestion earlier, he
had not given any direction for its implementation. Trvunan
was greatly disturbed for it looked as if he had broken
faith with Weizmann. Through his advisor, Clark Clifford,
he discovered what had transpired. ^^ Marshall had forwarded
a memorandum to the President outlining the procedure for
introducing the trusteeship proposal to the Assembly. This
had been acted upon in the belief that Truman had given his
formal approval. Apparently he had not. Truman felt that
this time had been chosen for the release of the plan in an
attempt to force his hand. Weizmann, at any rate, remained
^^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II, p. 190. Interview
with A. J. Granoff, Kansas City, August 22, 1965.
^^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II, pp. 190-193. A.
Lilienthal, p. 77. R. Ferrell, manuscript in author's
possession. Ferrell relates Truman's conversation with
Admiral William D. Leahy, that the announcement had come
without his permission or knowledge. Leahy was highly
critical of the State Department, particularly Secretary
of State Marshall.
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unshaken. He telephoned Jacobson on March 2.2 reassuring
him: "I do not believe that President Truman knew what was
going to happen in the United Nations on Friday when he
talked to me the day before. "°'
There was an immediate and violent outcry by Zion-
ists, the press and congressmen against Austin's speech.
It was labelled by New York Democrat Arthur Klein: "The
68
most terrible sell out of the common people since Munich."
Telegrams and letters poured in to the White House voicing
shock and anger at this "infamous betrayal", "brutal rever-
sal", and "cynical denial of all that is fine and honest in
the American tradition. "^^ The Jewish newssheet, PM,
bitterly complained: "We who thought the United States had
been fumbling and bumbling along were very much mistaken.
Behind the mask of the bumbler was the face of the deceiv-
er."^^ Feeling ran very high. Even the New York Times
67e. Jacobson to A. Granoff. Quoted in Kansas City
Star , May 13, 1965.
^%ew York Times , March 20, 1948, Press Cutting
file, Truman Library.
^^The Tuscon Jewish Community Council, representing
several local chapters of the major Jewish organizations of
America, telegrammed Truman on March 24, 1948 using simi-
lar phrases to describe Administration policy. O.F. 204,
Truman Library.
^QpM, March 21, 19 48, Press Cutting file, Truman
Library. PM viewed the decision as a victory for the Truman
Doctrine and oil diplomacy. But it was not a move for peace,
rather it was another and gigantic step towards war.
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described Truman's policy as: "A series of moves which has
seldom been matched for ineptness in the handling of any
international issue by an American administration."
New York Democrats threatened revolt. Dr. Isaac
Levine, Brooklyn representative and State Democratic
Committeeman wrote to Truman: "Unless this calamitous and
un-American policy is immediately reversed we shall do
everything in our power to see that the Democratic party
rejects your candidacy at the Democratic National Conven-
tion. "72 The Washington Star commented on March 22: "With
his reversal of the partition of Palestine, the President
created a pressure around party heads in pivotal states
which roughly compares in emotion and intensity with that
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engendered in the South by the civil-rights issue."
Warren Moscow in the New York Times was alone in suggesting
that such protests might be only for public consumption. 74
Senator Hatch was one of Truman's few supporters in this
7^New York Times , March 21, 1948, Press Cutting
file, Truman Library.
"721. Levine to Truman, March 23, 1948, O.F. 204,
Truman Library.
"^^Washington Star , March 22, 1948, Press Cutting
file, Truman Library. The Star editorial went on to say
that the Democratic Chairmen for New York, Illinois and
California said that they did not think they could carry
their states with Harry Truman at the moment. The Star
commented that Trioman got little support from Capitol hill
in his hard choices because he cut himself off from Congress.
7^New York Times , March 23, 1948, Press Cutting file,
Truman Library.
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turmoil of criticism. Hatch told reporters" "He [Truman]
has cast aside politics and he doesn't care what happens to
him politically. He has told me that he intends to do what
he thinks is right without regard to the political conse-
II 7 5quences. " '-» . ^
Truman's public statement on March 25, that the
United States had not rejected partition, did little to
lessen the attacks and pressure directed at him. The New
York Daily News reported on March 26: "President Truman's
latest attempt to pour soothing oil on the troubled waters
of Palestine left him worse off politically than before he
opened his mouth at the White House press conference to
sound off with a 450 word prepared statement sweated out by
the most inept political staff that a harrassed Chief Exe-
cutive has ever been cursed with."^^ A poll of every New
York Democrat member of Congress indicated, said the News ,
that the President could rely upon about one half of the
delegation to back him at the Democratic Convention in July.
Yet the trusteeship proposal was not an abandonment,
reversal or substitute for the partition plan. It was, as
Truman pointed out in his March 25 statement: "...an effort
to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination of
75New York Times , March 24, 194 8, Press Cutting
file, Truman Library.
^^New York Daily News , March 26, 1948, Press Cutting
File, Truman Library. The paper described the events of the
previous few days as, "...one of the most amazing develop-
ments in the history of American politics since the Civil
War."
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the mandate on May 15. The trusteeship does not prejudice
the character of the final political settlement. It would
establish the conditions of order which are essential to a
peaceful solution." Truman's concern was that there
would be no public authority in Palestine capable of pre-
serving law and order. ^^ Trusteeship seemed the only solu-
tion. In the meantime the President was making strenuous
efforts to arrange a truce between the Jews and Arabs.
"With such a truce and such a trusteeship, a peaceful
settlement is yet possible;" Truman believed. Without
them, "open warfare is just over the horizon. American
policy in this emergency period is based squarely upon the
recognition of this inescapable fact."'" •
George Marshall explained the American position in
more detail to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a few
days later. There was in November 1947, he said, a belief
that there would be little violence in Palestine. This
forecast had proven to be incorrect. Implementation of
^^Harry S. Truman, Statement issued March 25, 1948.
O.F. 204, Truman Library.
^^"Unless emergency action is taken," the President
voiced his alarm, "there will be no public authority in
Palestine on that date capable of preserving law and order.
Violence and bloodshed will descend upon the Holy Land.
Large scale fighting among the people of that country will
be the inevitable result. Such fighting would infect the
entire Middle East and could lead to consequences of the
gravest sort involving the peace of this nation and the
entire world. " Ibid.
79 Ibid.
partition through the United Nations would mean the involve-
ment of Russian troops. They had shown the tendency to
remain in areas which they occupied. This would press
down again on Greece, Turkey and the Arabian oil fields
which were vital for the entire European recovery program.
The fact that Russia was looking for a warm water port
added to the danger of Russian troops in the area. The only
solution, Marshall argued, was to turn the matter over to
the United Nations Trusteeship Council. As Russia was not
represented on this Council, the danger of Russian military
intervention would be avoided. "Absolutely no domestic
political questions," he concluded, were involved in this
decision. ^0
An unsigned Senate Memorandum, filed in the McGrath
papers, supports Marshall's interpretation of the factors
involved in the decision. The memorandum traces Truman's
Palestine policy through to recognition in a defence of the
Administration's position. ^'- 100,000 troops would have been
required to enforce partition the memorandum claims. This
figure was the estimate of the Department of Defence.
Japanese and German troop commitments made this impossible.
Furthermore, the use of American troops to preserve inter-
national peace could be defended. Their use to enforce
partition could not. Regarding the claims that the decision
Q^New York Times , March 25, 194 8, Press Cutting
file, Trioman Library.
^
-^Senate Memorandum, McGrath MSS, Trviman Library.
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was made for reasons of domestic politics, the memorandum
went on, the facts belied the charge. When Austin made
the situation in Palestine known to the Security Council:
His plea was misunderstood and the plan labelled an
"abandonment" of partition— .The incident was magni-
fied by Communists and Republicans who saw in the
misunderstanding the possibility of weaning the Jew-
ish vote from the President. The fact that the plan
was definitely part of the bipartisan foreign policy
was gleefully ignored and the President was excori-
ated. 82
Why, it asked, if he were playing politics, would the
President have made such an unpopular decision? Zionists
had allowed their emotions to be played upon, especially by
Wallace supporters. Truman's decision had been made in the
best interests of the United States and to protect the Jews
from further bloodshed. ^^
Joseph and Stewart Alsop in one of their "inside
stories" related an incident that also suggests that domes-
tic politics did not play any large part in formulating
Truman's Palestine policy at this time.^^ The Alsops re-
vealed that in the first week of February, Truman had warned
the Democratic National Committee against interfering in the
Palestine question. He told McGrath and Gael Sullivan,
Executive Director, that the task of policy making was now
Q^ Ibid .
. ,
83ibid .
84joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," New
York Herald Tribune , February 11, 1948, Press Cutting file,
Truman Library. .< »,- -. ..
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in the hands of the newly formed National Security Covmcil.
He did not want them offering unauthorized encouragement
to Zionist leaders, the Alsops wrote. McGrath and Sulli-
van assented to the President's injunction, they added,
"because of their sense of the terrible dangers inherent
in this problem. "°^
Another significant point in this question of moti-
vation through reasons of political expediency, is the fact
that many Jewish groups regarded America's Palestine policy
as bipartisan. Describing the policy as being, "in the
interests of a handful of oil magnates and imperialists who
are more concerned with profits than the well being and
democratic rights of people," one group stated: "The
American people realize that the present policy is a bu-
partisan betrayal and that the Democratic and the Republi-
can parties are equal partners in guilt. For the Palestine,
policy is an integral part of the general foreign policy
which both parties shared equally in forming. "°"
The second Special Session of the General Assembly
met briefly to discuss Palestine on April 1, and adjourned
until April 16. There was little it could do until the Uni-
ted States presented its proposals for discussion. Four
days later the American delegate submitted a working paper
85Ibid.
^^United Committee to save the Jewish State and the
United Nations, to H. McGrath, April 15, 1948, McGrath MSS,
Truman Library.
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entitled, "Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine,"
which embodied proposals similar to those which Austin had
presented to the Security Council on March 19.^"^ It soon
became apparent that discussion on the proposal was going
to be desultory and drawn out. It was also obvious that
trusteeship, just as partition, could not be enforced with-
out an adequate armed neutral force. Britain was determined
not to remain longer than May 14, a fact only now being
fully realized by the Administration and both protagonists
in Palestine.
The crux of the trusteeship proposal remained then,
would America send troops. The British had been unable to
maintain peace with a force of 90,000 men. Truman in his
March 25 statement had asserted, "We must take our share
of the necessary responsibility."^^ These months were full
of uncertainty and confusion as to the future of Palestine.
In January the "Arab Liberation Army" organized, trainedcl
and armed by Syria for the Arab League States began entering
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Palestine. By the end of March 5,000 men had infiltrated.
The pattern of Arab strategy was to dominate the roads, thus
controlling the lines of communication. The Arabs hoped in
87a. Lilienthal, p. 79. The proposal failed to
gain the required two-thirds majority.
^^Harry S. Truman, Statement issued March 25, 1948.
Truman Library.
^^Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab Israeli War, 1948
(London: Faber, 1956), p. 35.
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this way to isolate the outlying villages from the main
centres of Jewish population in Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel
Aviv. They had considerable success at first. The Yishuv
were completely demoralized by Arab successes by the end of
January. ^^ At the time Truman was defending temporary
trusteeship as the only way to secure peace and stability,
Jerusalem was virtually in the hands of the Arabs. Jewish
hopes looked very small without outside assistance. It was
with the knowledge of these circumstances and prospects that
Truman stated that he was prepared to send troops to Pales-
tine. Rather than a betrayal of partition this was a des-
perate effort to save it until Jews and Arabs could reach
a peaceful settlement.
During April the balance swung in favor of the
Yishuv. Armed with a shipment of arms which arrived from
Czechoslovakia at the end of March, the Jewish Defence
Organization, the Haganah, took the offensive. Their most
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significant victory was the capture of Haifa on April 22.
By early May they also had control of Jaffa and most of
Eastern Galilee. And Jerusalem had not fallen. The most
surprising aspect of this offensive was the complete evacu-
ation of the Arabs from their towns and villages as the
Jews advanced. ^^ It appeared that the strength and tenacity
of the Arab forces had been much exaggerated.
^^Jon and David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies (New
York: Praeger, 1960), p. 90.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 117-124. ^^O'Ballance, pp. 63-67.
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Amidst this confusion, the United Nations hesita-
ted and delayed making any decision. By May 2, the Yishuv
had carved out for itself a state roughly that approved by
the United Nations in November. They went ahead with plans
to announce an independent state on May 15. Truman's
appointment of pro-Zionist General John Hildring as Assist-
ant Secretary of State for Palestinian Affairs, indicated
that the United States would not press its trusteeship
proposal. ^3 The United Nations was prepared to make a
decision by default.
On May 14, 1948 the Union Jack was hauled down from
Government House in Jerusalem and the British mandate came
to an end. Already that afternoon, the State of Israel had
been proclaimed. ^^ Within minutes of the expiration of the
mandate at Midnight, May 15, the United States extended
de facto recognition. Truman's announcement came shortly
after 6:00 P.M. Washington time on the afternoon of May 14:
"This government has been informed that a Jewish state has
been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been
requested by the provisional government thereof. The Uni-
ted States recognizes the provisional government as the
95
de facto authority of the new State of Israel."
93a. Lilienthal, p. 81. Wallace R. Deuel, St. Louxs
Post Dispatch , June 20, 1948, gives an account of this
appointment. Press Cutting file, Truman Library.
94j. and D. Kimche, p. 155.
95Harry S. Truman, Statement issued May 14, 1948,
O.F. 204, Triiman Library. _f ' ^
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The response to Truman's act of recognition was
strangely subdued. Everybody agreed with the Washington
Star of May 16 that; "It is a wise decision and a heart-
ening one."^^ Harry S. Truman had recognized an inescapa-
ble fact, editorialized the New York Herald Tribune , "this
step was the only one which was consonant with American
traditions and the realities of the case. "9'.
But the press was highly critical of Truman's hand-
ling of the matter; an attitude followed, as was seen in
Chapter I, by later historians. The Washington Post com-
mented on May 17:
Diplomats were shocked because the United States so
suddenly flipflopped from a policy of confusion and
indecision on Palestine to a positive act taken in
unprecedented haste. Regardless of the merits of any
particular action that is taken this erratic manner
of conducting our foreign policy costs the United
States dearly in terms of prestige and world leader-
ship. ^8
The Philadelphia Enquirer of May 15 explained Truman's
behavior as a response to the danger, in recent weeks, of
his losing considerable Jewish support. ^^ The New York
Herald Tribune described Truman's conduct as "porpoise
like." It not only caused the loss of dignity of American
^
^
Washington Star , May 16, 1948. Press Cutting
file, Truman Library.
^"^New York Herald Tribune , May 15, 1948. Press
Cutting file, Truman Library.
98washington Post , May 17, 1948. Press Cutting
file, Truman Library.
^^Philadelphia Enquirer , May 15, 1948. Press
Cutting file, Truman Library.
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diplomats but gave the suggestion that the United States
was a "fumbling giant. "1°° The New York Times was disturbed
by the spectacle of American delegates at the United Na-
tions apparently unaware of United States policy. 101
This decision was not a matter of a snap judgment
made on the spur of the moment, Charles G. Ross, White House
Press Secretary pointed out. 1^2 j^ had been in mind for a
good while. As suggested above, the favorable turn of
events for the Yishuv since early May was a major factor
in Truman's considerations. The crisis came in the last
few days of the mandate. Weizmann wrote a personal letter
to Triiman on May 13, requesting that he extend prompt
recognition to the provisional government. '^^ Truman met
with Marshall, Lovett and Clifford on May 12 at Blair House,
to make a decision on recognition. According to the account
of this meeting by Jonathan Daniels, Marshall heatedly ob-
jected to Clifford's advocacy of recognition on political
grounds. "Mr. President," he said, "this is not a matter
to be determined on the basis of politics. Unless politics
were involved, Mr. Clifford would not even be at this con-
IQ^New York Herald Tribune , May 16, 1948. The re-
sult would be, said the Tribune
, that there will be no con-
fidence in the moral purpose and integrity of America.
Press Cutting file, Truman Library.
lOlNew York Times
,
May 15, 1948, Press Cutting file,
Truman Library.
IQ^Cleveland Plain Dealer , May 16, 1948, Press Cut-
ting file, Truman Library.
^^^A. Lilienthal, p. 82.
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ference. This is a serious matter of foreign policy deter-
mination and the question of politics and political opinion
does not enter into it-''^^"^ Nevertheless, the following
day, Marshall agreed to recognition providing he had a
few days to consult with the British and the French. ^^^
A cable of Eliahu Epstein to Moshe Shertok (later
Sharett, who became Foreign Minister of Israel) reveals the
activities of May 14. ^^^ During the morning, Loy Henderson
telephoned Epstein to ascertain the boundaries of the new
State. Epstein advised him that they were in accord with
the United Nations resolution. Some hours later, Clark
Clifford advised Washington supporters of the Jewish cause
that at noon the State Department agreed to extend immedi-
ate recognition in the event of their receiving such a
request. Epstein, together with Ben Cohen, former counse-
lor of the Department, drafted a letter and sent it to the
President and the Secretary of State. Epstein concludes
with the statement that the circumstances required that he
take full responsibility for sending the letter.
Tr\aman issued his recognition statement on the basis
of the letter from Epstein on behalf of the provisional
government.
104jonathan Daniels, The Man of Independence (New
York: Lippincott, 1950), p. 319.
lO^Ibid.
, p. 319. .
l^^Epstein to Shertok, May 14, 1948. Weizmann MSS,
Truman Library.
EPILOGUE
President Truman's recognition of Israel was not an
act taken to gain Jewish votes. It was done with the con-
viction that recognition was in America's national interest.
It held out the hope that Palestine might be rescued from
all out warfare. There were many encouraging factors. The
unity of the Arab League Nations was questionable and the
strength of their armies doubtful.-'- If faced by a resolute
nation supported by the United States, Britain, Russia,
France and the United Nations, it seemed unlikely that they
would vigorously carry out their threats of invasion. Cer-
tainly there was the very strong possibility of a truce be-
ing effected through a United Nations mediator. Further-
more, Truman was on firm ground in recognizing the only pro-
fessed democratic country in the Middle East. Especially
as the future of the thousands of Jewish refugees depended
upon the survival of the new state.
The President felt very keenly that foreign relations
was no place for political maneuver. The extent to which he
regarded Israel as a non political question can be seen from
'The Baltimore Sun commented on May 16, 194 8. "It
would be a miracle if they [the Arabs] managed to overlook
these jealousies and act as a unit against Israel." While
this was overly optimistic, it was a widespread opinion.
Press Cutting file, Truman Library.
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his handling of the situation between May and December
1948.
In the first place, de facto recognition of the
provisional government of Israel was simply the recognition
of a reality. It was a minimal step to gain the ends out-
lined in the previous chapter. American Zionists con-
stantly pressed Truman to extend de jure recognition. Tru-
man refused to do so vintil elections had been held and the
government became permanent. There was no reason or war-
rant for making the nature of recognition dependent upon
whether the government was provisional or permanent. The
United States had fully recognized the provisional govern-
ments of Russia in 1917 and Poland immediately after World
War II, under conditions far more precarious than those
which existed in Palestine in May 1948. ^ America was, in
fact, the only country of the United Nations, other than
South Africa, to limit recognition to de facto . -^ Yet be-
tween May and the elections of November, Truman did not
alter his position on this, despite the obvious political
advantage to be gained by doing so. .
A second issue related to the arms embargo and the
United Nations mediation. On May 14 the General Assembly
passed a resolution providing for the appointment of a
^Memorandum from David Ginsberg to David Niles,
July 21, 1948. O.F. 204, Truman Library.
^B. Crum to Truman, September 21, 1948. O.F. 204,
Trviman Library.
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United Nations mediator in Palestine. He was to cooperate
with the Truce Commission of the Security Council and
4
"promote a peaceful adjustment of the future in Palestine."
Two weeks later the Assembly issued a cease-fire order and
the imposition of a four week truce. This truce went into
effect from June 11 to July 9 and was followed by another
shortly after which lasted from July 18 until October.^
In the course of these months the Arabs gained little more
than about half a million destitute Arab refugees from
Israel. But this period had been a harrowing one for the
supporters of Israel. The new state urgently needed arms
and the President received endless requests to lift the
arms embargo on the Middle East.
The situation became desperate in September. The
United Nations Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was
assassinated in Jerusalem on September 17. The next day the
General Assembly released his report proposing new terri-
torial divisions in Palestine.^ This revision, which
Bernadotte had first suggested in July, drastically reduced
the area of Israel. It recommended that the Negev be
awarded to the Arabs. If the Jews were to retain this
region, which was essential for the settlement and economic
development of Israel, military equipment and United States
^F. Manuel, p. 350.
^E. O'Ballance, pp. 126, 165. , ''
'
^F. Manuel, pp. 351-2.
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support were indispensable. But within a week, Secretary
Marshall told the Assembly that America accepted the new
proposal.^
Zionists protested vigorously to Triiman at this
"shocking acceptance by Marshall," this "betrayal of Ameri-
can policy."^ Several letters threatened that it would
seriously injure the President's election hopes. McGrath
anxiously pressed Truman to take a forthright stand against
the plan. He suggested that Truman make a concrete
announcement just before the Jewish Rosh Hashanah holidays.
It would become, he said, "rich material for the holiday
sermons. Praise and thanksgiving would be echoed from
every Jewish home and no Jewish leader could fail to sing
the President's praise."^ Truman refused to make such a
statement, or to lift the arms embargo.
Weizmann wrote hastily to Jacobson to see the
President and remind him of his earlier encouragement to
the Jewish state. 1^ Jacobson replied in November that
"^Ibid.
, p. 352.
°Rabbi David Aronson, President of the Rabbinical
Assembly of America, to Truman, September 24, 1948, O.F.
204, Truman Library. F. Kirchwey to H. McGrath, August A,
194 8, McGrath MSS, Truman Library.
n
^This plan was suggested to McGrath by Harry M.
Fisher on September 28, 1948. McGrath MSS, Truman Library.
l^Weizmann to Jacobson, September 27, 1948, O.F.
204, Truman Library. Jacobson wrote to Matt Connelly
passing on this letter with the comment, "Help convince
the boss how urgent it is for him to act immediately."
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during these months the President had retained his friend-
ship for Weizmann and had told him there was nothing to
worry about concerning Israel. -*• As late as October 13,
when he was on his famous whistlestop trip, Truman refused
to introduce the Palestine issue into the campaign. He
received a memorandiom from New York Congressional delega-
tion urging him to speak out against the Bernadotte Plan.^^
Only after Governor Dewey issued a strong statement accusing
Truman of betraying his pledges to Israel, did the President
make a statement of his own. This was in his Madison Square
Garden speech of October 24. Truman reiterated his support
for the Democratic plank on Palestine accepting the bounda-
ries set up by the partition resolution.-'-^ But he made no
further promises or commitments.
President Truman's policy and action between May and
November 194 8 do not suggest a course based on political
expediency. They reflect more, as had all of Truman's deci-
sions on this matter, the tremendous uncertainty and com-
plexity of the Palestinian affair. Truman wrote to Weizmann
on the first anniversary of the United Nations partition
resolution. "As I read your letter," the President reflected
Hjacobson to Weizmann, November 29, 194 8, Weizmann
MSS, Truman Library.
q l^^illiam M. Doyle to M. Connelly, October 13, 1948,
O.F. 2 04, Truman Library.
13
-^-'Harry s. Truman. Statement issued October 24,
1948, O.F. 204, Truman Library.
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"I was struck by the common experience you and I have
recently shared. We had both been abandoned by the so
called realistic experts to our supposedly forlorn lost
causes. Yet we both kept pressing for what we were sure
was right — and we were both proven to be right. "^^
He could hardly foresee the nature of the problems
that lay ahead.
'•
.<
: ' f ' i
"
I'^Truman to Weizmann, November 29, 1948. O.F. 204,
Truman Library.
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ABSTRACT
In 1948 A.D., just over 2,000 years after the
Diaspora* of 68 B.C., a Jewish state came into existence
in Palestine. This was of considerable significance to the
United States. Not only was it an additional consideration
in the formulation of foreign policy towards the Middle East,
but America had played a major part in the establishment of
the state of Israel. President Truman has been subjected
to considerable attack as a result of this, by critics who
interpret his actions as being motivated by an ethnic press-
ure group and domestic politics rather than by the national
interest.
This study analyses the factors leading up to the
decision by President Truman to recognize Israel. Such an
analysis reveals that although tremendous pressure was
exerted by Zionist organizations. Congressmen, the press
and the Democratic National Committee, on Truman to support
the foundation of a Jewish state in Palestine, he was reluc-
tant to do so. Nor was it domestic politics that led him
finally to act. Recognition in May 1948; with its implica-
tions of winning the Jewish vote in the elections of that
year; was not the crucial decision for the future of Israel.
Diaspora — the dispersion of the Jews.
It was, rather, the decision to support the United Nations
proposal for partition in Fall 1947.
American interest and activity in the Middle East
before 19 39 had been desultory. During World War I, Bri-
tain had made incompatible promises to the Arabs and
Jews
in Palestine; while promising Arab independence she had
issued the Balfour Declaration supporting a Jewish National
Home in Palestine. The American Government had from time
to time supported this Declaration. The situation was
brought dramatically to a head by Hitler and World War
II,
and this was the problem Truman inherited.
Truman, at first concerned only with the fate of
Jewish refugees, became alarmed at the growing
unrest and
violence in Palestine. He welcomed the British
decision
early in 1947 to turn the matter over to the
United Nations
and hoped a peaceful solution would be possible.
His old
business partner and friend Eddie Jacobson dispelled
any
doubts he may have had as to the justness of the Jewish
case. Truman saw Israel, furthermore, as a
vital strong-
hold in the Middle East to act as a bulwark of
democracy
in containing Russia and Communism.
The President's solution was to support the
United
Nations partition plan. By taking this action he
pursued
a policy balanced between the opposing forces
of Zionism on
the one hand and the State Department on the
other. His
decision to recognize Israel on May 14, 1948, was
based on
the realities of the situation which existed in Palestine
at that time, and on the hope that peace would result.
Trviman's decision may have brought added United States
problems to the Middle East, but this was because of factors
in the emerging world situation which he could hardly have
anticipated.
